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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine individual-level citizen participation in 
the notice and comment component of federal agency rulemaking.  Three research 
questions are addressed.  First, who participates?  Previous studies have examined the 
role of interest groups (Golden, 1998), the content of comments (Cuèllar, 2005), and 
agency procedures in handling comments (Paglin and Shor, 1977; West, 1984; Balla, 
1998; Yackee and Yackee, 2006).  This study focuses on characteristics of individual 
commenters.  The second research question is to what extent are these participants 
representative of the general public?  This is accomplished through a detailed comparison 
of notice and comment participants to norms for the general public.  The final question is 
to what extent the inclusion of these participants in the notice and comment process is 
compatible with the democratic ideals of liberty, equality, and fairness?   
At the root of these questions lies a conflict of visions of public participation in 
the American republic.  One vision is representative democracy and it emphasizes public 
participation in the electoral process.  The other vision is participatory democracy and it 
emphasizes direct citizen involvement in government decision-making.  While the 
resolution of this conflict is beyond the scope of this study, some elaboration of the 
controversy is necessary in order to understand the historical foundations of the 
contemporary debate on the appropriate role of citizens in what is essentially a legislative 
function. 
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The delegation of authority to agencies to make rules began in the first 
session of Congress when the president was authorized to make rules governing 
trade with Indian tribes.  Delegation increased rapidly during the later portion of 
the Nineteenth Century as Congress faced the challenge of regulating monopolies. 
War and economic upheaval further expanded delegation to federal agencies, 
boards, and commissions.  The explosion of federal rulemaking during the New 
Deal nearly triggered a constitutional crisis with Roosevelt's Court Packing plan.  
Subsequently, Roosevelt initiated the Brownlow Committee and the Attorney 
General's Committee on Administrative Procedure to study federal rulemaking 
and make the process more uniform throughout the agencies.  Delayed by World 
War II, the result of these deliberations would form the basis of the 
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (Kerwin, 2003). 
The requirement for public participation in the notice and comment component of 
federal agency rulemaking is authorized in relatively modest language.  Congress merely 
requires that: 
After notice required by this section, the agency shall give interested 
persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through 
submission of written data, views, or arguments with or without 
opportunity for oral presentation. After consideration of the relevant 
matter presented, the agency shall incorporate in the rules adopted a 
concise general statement of their basis and purpose (5 U. S. C. §553c, 
2006). 
 
From such humble beginnings, seeds of the "participation revolution" (Kerwin, p. 
166) found fertile soil.  Starling (1982) describes earlier models of public decision-
making that emphasized a rational process in which the planning of public programs 
progressed through a particular progression.  Trained professionals planned programs.  
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After a problem was identified, alternatives would be determined and evaluated.  One 
alternative would be selected, a plan of action would be designed, and that plan would be 
implemented.  Subsequently, a process of feedback and review would determine the need 
and nature of changes.  Starling noted that this process suffered from two particular 
weaknesses.  First, planners generally considered too few options.  Second, planners 
frequently failed to question assumptions.   
So, as the flood of delegation of the New Deal heightened public concern about 
agency rulemaking, the inclusion of more viewpoints was seen as an improvement in the 
decision process.  And, Kerwin argues that the development of rules is a crucial avenue 
for increased public involvement in the decisions of agencies:  
 
Rulemaking adds opportunities for and dimensions to public participation 
that are rarely present in the deliberations of Congress or other 
legislatures.  It is often difficult for interested parties to determine exactly 
what a bill under consideration means to them.  The more vague the 
proposed provisions, the more difficult it is for the public to decide 
whether participation is worth the effort and, if so, what position to take 
(p. 31). 
 
In rulemaking the decisions regarding participation become much clearer 
because the issues are better defined, the actions government is 
contemplating are more specific, and the implications for affected parties 
are much easier to predict.  Positions are thus easier to formulate and 
articulate.  And there are many ways for the public to get involved in 
rulemaking and to influence the content of rules.  The cost of effective 
participation in rulemaking may be lower, and the chances of success in 
rulemaking greater than those that front the public during legislative 
deliberations (pp. 31-2). 
 
Also, Kerwin identifies specific advantages to those most involved the 
rulemaking process.  He points out that Congress frees itself from the tedium of detail 
while indemnifying itself from the squabbles and acrimony frequently experienced in the 
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rulemaking process.  After the Reagan era reforms requiring the Office of Management 
and Budget to review all agency rules, presidents gain substantially more input into the 
details of public policy.  Jurists, especially those with strong views in particular policy 
areas, gain a vehicle for imposing their will on agency operations.  State and local 
governments get a chance to impact proposed rules in ways that may facilitate subsequent 
implementation or preserve state autonomy for a particular policy.  Among the ranks of 
bureaucrats, policy zealots realize increased policy influence.  And, of course, interest 
groups that already enjoy a strong influence in the debates of Congress gain an additional 
opportunity to influence agency deliberations.   
And, as might be expected, those left out of the direct benefits are the first to 
complain.  With the crush of interstate highway construction, and massive urban renewal 
projects during the 1950s and 1960s, public reaction to government policy-making was 
negative, especially among the disadvantaged (Wamsley et al 1990).  A belief that 
participation would empower the unrepresented fueled the drive to expand the voice of 
the public in agency decision-making (Kerwin).  Congress responded by requiring 
increased public participation in new programs, including a short-lived flirtation with 
maximum feasible participation in urban economic development programs (Economic 
Opportunity Act of 1964).  Also, Congress enhanced the role of stakeholders in many 
Great Society and subsequent laws (Kerwin).  While this may have turned the attention of 
protesters away from Congress in the short term, public administrators increasingly 
became the whipping boys of both liberals who wanted more and conservatives who 
wanted less from government programs (Wamsley et al).   
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A movement within the field of public administration sought to remedy these 
negative images and sought to move public administration from its traditional grounding 
in scientific management and progressivism to a more democratic grounding upon public 
interest and citizen participation.  Among the key goals of this Refounding Movement are 
a commitment to greater social equity, a concern for wider participation, and a critical 
outlook toward the shortcomings of logical positivism and pluralism (Wamsley et al).  In 
their "Blacksburg Manifesto" (Wamsley et al, p. 6), these proponents of "The Public 
Administration" (p.34) claim a constitutional basis for the legitimacy of administration, 
independent of elected representatives.   
The Public Administration as an institution of government has as valid a 
claim to being representative of the people in both a sociological and 
functional sense as a federal judge appointed for life, a freshman 
congressman narrowly elected by a small percentage of the citizens in 
southeast Nebraska or a senator from Rhode Island.  For that matter, The 
Public Administration may be as representative of the people as a whole as 
a president elected by a coalition of voting blocs and interest groups 
claiming victory based on less than 51 percent of the popular vote and 
29.9 percent of the eligible voters, which in turn is approximately 19 
percent of the total populace (pp.46-47). 
 
Also, they assert an ability to understand the public interest and act on it in a 
fashion superior to mere elected officials who are under the influence of special interests.  
The source of this new and extra-constitutional legitimacy and understanding is the direct 
involvement of agency clients in the process of governance (Wamsley et al).  But their 
faith may not be supported by historical evidence.  At the root of the Refounding 
Movement's infatuation with direct citizen involvement in the legislative process is a 
flawed model of direct democracy that has been handed down to us through the ages in 
highly romanticized accounts of Athenian democracy.  It is the image of radicalized 
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citizen participation transmitted through the classics that sets what has become a standard 
for democracy in future generations (Saxonhouse, 1993).  However, archeological 
evidence challenges the actual level of participation achieved by these most worthy and 
revered democrats of Athens.  Modern studies of the seating capacity of the Pynx, the 
meeting place of the Athenian assembly, indicate that no more than one-third of the 
eligible citizens could have attended any meeting.  This would tend to undermine theories 
of the ubiquity of Athenian participation, especially when one considers the complete 
exclusion of women, slaves, and a relatively large immigrant community (Saxonhouse).   
Perhaps the Refounding Movement would be nothing more than an historical 
aside were it not for its impact on a small and rather elite group of American academics. 
Although there are relatively few professors of public administration in the nation's elite 
colleges, this particular set of academics mold the minds of many top-level, as well as the 
rank and file, state and federal agency managers.  This public management core has 
historically exerted a strong and undemocratic influence on the entire process of 
governance.  Heclo (2002) would label this undemocratic influence "administrative 
stewardship" and argue that it is "a calling to take care for the wellbeing of the public 
household" (p. 692) in spite of short sighted demands of politicians and citizens.  In the 
arena of agency rulemaking, administrative stewardship is especially critical.  Surrounded 
as they are by the most interested parties, it is only the watchfulness of the bureaucrat that 
protects the interests of the lambs from the avarice of the lions.  To the extent that more 
democratic influence, meaning direct public involvement, is induced into the system, less 
stewardship is possible.   
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American's fascination with that form of democracy requiring direct public 
involvement in policy making would have shocked and dismayed the Framers of the 
Constitution.  Delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1787 held a fundamental 
distrust of direct democracy.  In Federalist # 10, Madison paints a dire portrait of what he 
describes as the popular governments of earlier periods. 
... such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and 
contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security or 
the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as 
they have been violent in their deaths (Hamilton, Madison, and Jay, 1966, 
p. 81). 
 
Madison describes the protection of property as the primary purpose of 
government.  He contends that the greatest danger of popular government is its inability 
to control the avarice of groups desiring to use the power of government to achieve self-
interested goals.  He calls these narrowly interested groups factions. 
By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a 
majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some 
common impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to the rights of other 
citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community (p. 
78). 
The Framers wanted a government that would be sensitive to the will of the 
people.  But, equally important, they wanted a government that would protect individual 
rights, especially property rights.  Also, they wanted a government that would last.  So, 
when formulating plans for the government of the American empire, Madison and his 
colleagues sought to differentiate between those turbulent direct democracies like Athens 
and the more stable republican forms like Rome. 
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The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic 
are: first, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number 
of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, 
and greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended (p. 
82). 
 
These differences, representation and a large republic, formed two of the pillars of 
Madison's plan to protect liberty.  Truman (1951) argues that Madison’s dependence on 
the extent of the union for making the mischief of factions more difficult has been 
effectively overcome by improved transportation and communications.  While it may be 
true that advances in travel and communications have facilitated interest group 
interaction, Truman also stipulates that economic forces drive the formation of 
associations.  Since a larger republic would offer greater opportunities for diversity of 
interests and richer societies tend to have more interest groups, diversity and 
multiplication of interests might tend to impair the formation of a permanent majority 
faction, a beast that Madison describes as the true enemy of liberty.   
Likewise, Madison's reasoning for a representative government retains great 
merit. 
The effect of [representation] is, on the one hand, to refine and enlarge the 
public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of 
citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, 
and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it 
to temporary or partial considerations. Under such a regulation, it may 
well happen that the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the 
people, will be more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by 
the people themselves, convened for the purpose (Hamilton, Madison, and 
Jay, p. 82). 
 
Economic interests are not inherently factious.  However, they act factiously 
when given the opportunity to judge their own cases and advance their partial interests.  
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Madison counted on the moderating influence of political compromise to control these 
interests (Cary, 1994).  But, the Framers were not utopian dreamers.  They saw self-
interest as the bedrock of the American regime.  Public virtue would be rare and the 
private sector would dominate the public sector (Richardson and Nigro, 1987).  So, the 
federal Constitution sets relatively low expectations for public involvement, focused 
primarily on the process of electing representatives to express the will of the people.  It 
does not provide any specific process or institution for direct citizen involvement in 
lawmaking, where interests might act factiously if given the opportunity to judge their 
own case (Cary).  Although a strong advocate of greater citizen participation, Stivers 
acknowledges that: 
The system's original intent was to leave citizens free to pursue their 
private interests, having entrusted the public good to a structure that 
filtered and refined citizen views to produce government both 'adequate to 
the exigencies' that would ensue and protective of individual liberty 
(Wamsley et al, p. 248). 
 
Madison recognizes self-interest as problem in representative democracy, 
especially because of the susceptibility of the people's representatives to the enticements 
of interest. 
No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his interest 
would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his 
integrity. With equal, nay with greater reason, a body of men are unfit to 
be both judges and parties at the same time; yet what are many of the most 
important acts of legislation, but so many judicial determinations, not 
indeed concerning the rights of single persons, but concerning the rights of 
large bodies of citizens? And what are the different classes of legislators 
but advocates and parties to the causes which they determine? (Hamilton, 
Madison, and Jay, p. 79) 
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Madison realized that the forces of factions could not be eliminated without 
ending the liberty of the people.  Likewise, he understood that "...the resolution of these 
various and interfering interests..." (p.79) is a primary responsibility of any legislative 
body.  Diamond (1959) points out that the achievement of the goals of narrow interests 
from time to time would be essential for the survival of the republic.  Further, 
achievement would be most important for the more disadvantaged because they would 
always be more numerous than the rich.  By providing at least the possibility of all 
interests achieving their goals in some cases, America might avoid the violent class 
struggles experienced by those societies based on permanent classes of winners and 
losers.   
The fledgling republic could not rely on the virtue or nobility of a ruling elite to 
resolve factional conflicts.  The pool of virtuous candidates would be shallow, even in a 
large republic, and the forces of interest would be strong.  In the normal case, where the 
faction comprised less than a majority, Madison asserted that the diversity of interests of 
a large nation combined with the filtering effects of representation would suffice to hold 
factional excesses in control. 
If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the 
republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views 
by regular vote. It may clog the administration, it may convulse the 
society; but it will be unable to execute and mask its violence under the 
forms of the Constitution. (Hamilton, Madison, and Jay, p. 80) 
 
But, the republic would not always be so fortunate.  In some cases, interests 
would combine to achieve control of the people's representative body and private rights 
would be in danger.  The first line of defense would be found in limiting the powers of 
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the national government.  In Federalist #41, Madison describes national powers as limited 
to those specifically enumerated.  This enumeration served to circumscribe the reach of 
government authority.  Then, in Federalist #51, he goes on describe how "contriving the 
interior structure of the government as that its several constituent parts may, by their 
mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places " (Hamilton, 
Madison, and Jay, p. 320).   
First, the constitution divides power between the national and state governments.  
Then, it divides national power between three branches, each with the motive and 
resources to defend itself from the others.  Finally, it divides the power of the legislature, 
that branch, which the Framers considered the most dangerous, into two bodies with 
different terms of office and methods of selection, each capable of blocking the action of 
the other (Hamilton, Madison, and Jay).   
In simpler terms, the Framers of the American Constitution did what they could to 
arrange structures, some of which were quite undemocratic, to control the passions 
characteristic of democracy.  Subsequently, electoral majorities and the politicians who 
depend on their support have undone much of this handiwork, and the courts have 
undermined the remainder.  Visiting the United States only a generation after the writing 
of the Constitution, Tocqueville (1990) observed the unstoppable nature of the 
democratic majority.   
The very essence of democratic government consists in the absolute 
sovereignty of the majority; for there is nothing in democratic states that is 
capable of resisting it (p. 254).  The majority in that country [the United 
States], therefore, exercise a prodigious actual authority, and a power of 
opinion which is nearly as great; no obstacles exist which can impede or 
even retard its progress, so as to make it heed the complaints of those 
whom it crushes upon its path.  This state of things is harmful in itself and 
dangerous for the future (p. 256). 
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As America transformed itself from an agrarian to an industrial and then an 
information society, constitutional provisions originally designed to limit the power of 
the majority have been altered through amendment, interpretation, and practice.  Our 
complex economy and the regulatory state are facts of modern life, not mere alternatives 
in a normative argument.  Viewed in this light, the requirement for direct public 
involvement in agency rulemaking in the Administrative Procedure Act is nothing more 
than a continuation of the intrusion of democratic influence into an area that was 
deliberately designed to work outside the glare of the public spotlight.  By opening the 
doors of federal agencies to the public, there may be more sunshine in the decision-
making process, but what does this new light reveal for the future of our American 
republic?  When we read the words written by participants in the notice and comment 
process, do we hear the heavenly chorus of liberty, equality, and fairness in the voice of 
the people, or do we instead hear, as Herring (1936) has suggested, "...the squeal of pigs 
at the trough" (p. 3).   
From this historical perspective, this study proceeds to a more detailed 
investigation of the participants and the process.  First, existing theories of factors driving 
public participation are examined.  Next, the details of the research methodology are 
explained and hypotheses based on those theories are stated.  Then, data revealing actual 
patterns of participation are used to test hypotheses.  Also, descriptive data not used in 
hypothesis testing are presented to paint a more complete picture of the citizen 
participant.  In the final chapter, this study concludes by evaluating findings on public 
participation in agency rulemaking according to the standards of liberty, equality, and 
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fairness.  In addition, several proposed reforms are critiqued in light of the data 
presented. 
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Chapter 2 
Citizen Participation 
 
Ironically, group involvement with government has exploded at the same 
time that citizen involvement with both government and groups has 
diminished (Putnam, 2000, p. 52). 
 
In the previous chapter, the historical foundations of the contemporary dialogue 
on public participation in federal agency rulemaking are elaborated.  This chapter first 
investigates theories on the drivers of political participation.  Since the notice and 
comment process is political and participation in it is voluntary, it is expected that 
theories explaining participation in other forms of political activity will be applicable to 
this form of political activity.  Next, theories concerning the nature, necessity, and 
consequences of public participation in agency rulemaking are examined.  Although not 
used in hypothesis testing, these theories are useful in evaluating the compatibility of 
citizen participation with the democratic values of liberty, equality, and fairness. 
 
Drivers of Political Participation 
 
Research into political participation has routinely stressed the role of 
socioeconomic status, especially on low-cost activities such as voting (Gosnell, 1942; 
Lazarsfield, 1944; Key, 1950; Lipset, 1960; Lijphart, 1997).  Socioeconomic variables 
include wealth, education, race, and gender (Verba and Nie, 1972).  Age and marital 
status may be included, depending the measure of wealth.  The age variable proves to be 
a problem because income is often used as a surrogate for wealth.  People begin their 
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productive years earning less than they will in their more productive midlife.  However, 
after retirement, income drops.  So, the relationship of income to age is non-linear.  When 
the measure of wealth looks at net worth, we see that persons reaching retirement age 
have had the opportunity to accumulate sizeable equity and savings.  Even those less 
fortunate have whatever they have accumulated plus they achieve a retirement income 
without the expense of earning it, as well as the bonus of free medical care.  It is 
reasonable to assume that if all assets are included in a measure of socioeconomic status, 
persons reaching retirement age may have substantially more wealth than their retirement 
incomes suggest. 
But, the association between age and wealth may not be the most important 
reason for a strong role for age in predicting political participation.  Putnam attributes 
about half of the decline in political participation over the last half-century to 
generational change.  For members of the Great Generation, the Great Depression and 
World War II created shared adversity and a shared enemy, leading to a spirit of 
patriotism and civic engagement.  Because both depression and world war are deviations 
from normal day-to-day life, the level of engagement from which Putnam claims we have 
fallen may also be an anomaly.  Even so, it is an anomaly that has shaped the lives and 
expectations of subsequent generations.  Putnam finds that Baby Boomers, children of the 
Great Generation, have tended to place greater emphasis on individualism than traditional 
social roles.  Compared to their parents, they are slower to marry and quicker to divorce.  
Since a substantial percentage of married persons earn two incomes, lower rates of 
marriage would tend to diminish the accumulation of wealth.   
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Drawing on the 1990 Citizen Participation Study which deliberately over-sampled 
political activists, Verba, Schlozman, Brady, and Nie (1993) establish an important link 
between income, policy preference, and political influence. Although expressing political 
attitudes similar to low income respondents, political activists were found to be less 
dependent on social welfare programs, leading them to express different policy 
preferences.  Since non-activists participate in the political system at lower levels and less 
frequently than activists, the policy preferences of the disadvantaged are less likely to be 
heard.  These findings reinforce earlier research indicating the overrepresentation of the 
advantaged in the public policy arena (Schattschneider, 1960; Schlozman, 1984; 
Rosenstone and Hansen, 1990).   
Verba, Schlozman, Brady, and Nie conclude that: 
 
Our analysis has shown that although similar in their preferences as 
measured by standard NES attitude questions, citizens who are active are 
quite different in their demographic attributes, their economic needs, and 
the government benefits they receive.  These disparities are exacerbated 
when we move from the most common political act, voting, to acts that are 
more difficult, convey more information, and exert greater pressure (pp. 
313-4). 
 
Leighley (1995) offers two rival models for explaining the impact of 
socioeconomic status on political participation.  In the first, the socioeconomic status 
model of participation assumes that attitudes precede behavior.  Thus, our attitudes, 
determined by the social and economic circumstances of our daily lives, determine our 
propensity for political participation.  In the second, the mobilization model stresses the 
importance of political opportunities that may be a determined by the individual's 
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environment.  Of course, those with higher social and economic status would tend to have 
more opportunities, but, not necessarily, all of the opportunities.   
In order to take advantage of an opportunity, one must know that the opportunity 
exists.  This necessity points to a strong role of the media in making political information 
available.  Putnam finds a strong association between reading newspapers and measures 
of citizenship.  However, reading newspapers is declining as a result of generational 
succession.  Those who read newspapers are more likely to participate in political 
activities and they are more likely to watch news programs on television.  Ranney (1983) 
argues that television has replaced the role of the local political opinion leader in 
informing the public about politics.  Viewers passively absorb some political information, 
even when they do not seek it.  Similarly, Popkin (1991) finds that the media help shape 
voters’ limited knowledge of the world, providing links between issues and offices, 
public policy and outcomes.  These factors influence a voter’s frame of reference.  He 
describes the voter as a reasoning investor in collective goods using costly and imperfect 
information under conditions of uncertainty.  Gains or losses are long term and are not 
easily calculated.  So, citizens invest little in the acquisition of political information, 
relying on "gut reasoning" (p. 7) to process information from daily life, including that 
reaching them passively through their normal television viewing. 
In spite of the importance of the media in disseminating political information, 
both Ranney and Putnam see an important downside, especially to watching television.  
Ranney finds that the intensity of television coverage of elections has the unintended 
consequence of overloading viewers with political information.  The inundation of the 
potential voter with a superabundance of information about all campaigns results in 
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diminishing the importance of any particular campaign and, thus, trivializing the impetus 
for going to the polls.  Also, Ranney observes that the increase in time spent watching 
television absorbs time that may have been spent in other activities.  Putnam is more 
specific.  For each additional hour spent watching television each day, he predicts a 
decline of ten percent in civic activity. 
The Internet has the potential to be a rich source of political information, 
especially information about proposed federal agency rules.  Internet advocates claim that 
reducing the cost of acquiring political information via the Internet would increase 
political participation.  Putnam finds that when controlled for education, Internet users 
demonstrate average levels of social engagement, which is highly associated with 
political participation.  Looking at voting and campaign-related participation, Bimber 
(2001) finds no significant association between Internet use and various low-cost types of 
involvement. But, he finds that Internet usage is the strongest significant predictor for 
higher-cost political activities such as making contributions of money.   
Another and more traditional source of political information is a political 
association.  Putnam observes that cooperative forms of citizen participation have 
declined more rapidly than expressive forms.  Cooperative forms might include getting 
involved in a political campaign to influence an issue.  Expressive forms might include 
signing a petition or sending an electronic comment on a proposed federal agency rule.  
The decline in grass roots politics is a reflection of this trend.  Financial capital has 
replaced social capital in American elections.  Among younger Americans who do 
participate, Putnam finds a strong link between civic and political activity.   
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But, the link between social capital and political participation may be more 
complex.  Bowman and Boynton (1966) find a strong influence of primary groups, not 
associations, on the recruitment of British political party leaders.  Rosenstone and Hansen 
find little relationship between participation in non-political and political associations, 
possibly because of the treatment of religious groups, which Putnam describes as unlikely 
to engage in political activity.  However, they concur that voluntary political associations 
are critical in mobilizing individuals to take political action.  Ayala (2000) points out a 
distinction between the impact of voluntary and involuntary associations on political 
participation.  Acknowledging the importance of voluntary associations, he disputes the 
benefit of involuntary associations, such as those encountered in the workplace.  
Membership in labor unions may be legally required for employment in closed-shop 
states and company culture may exert a similar non-voluntary aspect for low-level 
managers' participation in corporate political action committees.  Thus, these forms of 
participation may serve to replace rather than enhance traditional political mobilization.   
Just as Putnam argues that association begets participation, Dahl (1989) argues 
that political participation begets political participation.  He divides the American public 
into two political species.  He calls those focused on their private activities Homo Civicus 
and those tending toward greater political participation Homo Politicus.  Homo Civicus 
generally avoids political involvement until threatened by particular actions or inactions 
of government.  The choices of Homo Civicus are swayed by inertia, habit, unexamined 
loyalties, emotions, and impulse.  When aroused, she uses political resources to achieve 
limited objectives.  When the threat is removed, she reverts to her more characteristic 
apolitical style.  On the other hand, Homo Politicus stalks the political jungle, using 
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resources to gain influence that may be converted back to resources.  Although only a 
small minority, Homo Politicus is far more calculating than his apolitical cousin and uses 
his cunning to exploit politically profitable issues.  Dahl's (1989) pluralist paradigm 
predicts that the most active political participants will use the expectation of benefits or 
deprivations as tools to forge individual interests into winning political coalitions that 
operate within the legal and constitutional framework of the existing order and use 
democratic forms.  
Guterbock and London (1983) find that high political trust and efficacy indicate a 
politically integrated individual who tends toward normal level of political participation.  
However, high trust and low efficacy predict political impotency.  Low trust combined 
with low efficacy is indicative of alienation, while low trust and high efficacy indicate the 
environment of ethnic politics.  Ethnic groups are similar to advocates of single issues in 
that they may see themselves isolated from the broader political culture that does not 
share their particular issue concerns.  If this is true, high efficacy and low trust would be 
descriptive of participants in the notice and comment process.   
Creig, Niemi, and Silver (1990) point out the difficulties involved in separating 
the belief that oneself is competent to address political issues, called internal efficacy, 
from the belief that the political system is responsive to citizen demands, which is called 
external efficacy.  Likewise, there are problems inherent in distinguishing between trust 
in the incumbents in public office and trust in the basic institutions of government.  
Creig, Niemi, and Silver find that typical respondents to the National Election Study are 
relatively strong in internal efficacy and that trust in government institutions remains firm 
in spite of respondents' distrust of incumbent political leaders. 
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Putnam finds a link between the trust, efficacy and social capital.  Overall, his 
data indicates that American social capital is in decline.  From bowling leagues to 
Kiwanis Clubs to Boy Scout Troops, a smaller proportion of Americans participate in 
civic activities than did sixty years ago.  Lower levels of civic activity lead to less contact 
among the citizens of a polity.  This is a problem because frequent interaction among a 
diverse set of people is associated with the norm of generalized reciprocity.  Generalized 
reciprocity is an indication of trust and the experience of interaction in an environment of 
trust increases efficacy and civic engagement as evidenced by continued interaction in 
associational activities.  Likewise, Kwak, Shah, and Holbert (2004) find that trust in 
others facilitates the extension of social activities into civic participation.  Brehm and 
Rahn (1997) also find a significant role for trust as a driver of participation, but stress the 
importance of cognitive abilities, economic resources, and general life satisfaction of the 
potential citizen participant.   
 
Participation in the Notice and Comment Process 
 
While the general subject of political participation has received much attention 
over the years, surprisingly little empirical research has been focused on citizen 
participation in the notice and comment process.  Yackee and Yackee find that although 
the notice and comment process may have lowered the cost of participation in federal 
rulemaking, the costs remain sufficiently high to inhibit the participation of individuals 
and public interest groups.  Agencies are more likely to alter rules to comply with 
business comments than with the comments of other kinds of interests.  Business interests 
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have greater financial resources allowing advantages in technical and legal expertise.  
Therefore, business interests make more comments and more of their comments affect 
rules.  Similarly, Golden finds an excessive influence of business interests among notice 
and comment participants, operating in definable issue networks.  She finds that these 
business interests enter and exit the policy arena as the focus of rulemaking activity 
changes.   
Cuèllar describes current methods of citizen participation as a compromise 
between aspirations for greater public involvement and the reality of citizen apathy, a 
complex regulatory environment, powerful interest groups, and a constrained 
bureaucracy.  Examining the content of participant comments, he finds that there are 
dramatic differences in the level of technical expertise displayed in the comments of 
individuals and those of organized interests.  However, the comments of organized 
interests do not contain the range of concerns expressed by individuals.  Cuèllar argues 
that while comments may signal the intensity of preferences, the failure to make a 
comment does not necessarily imply a lack of concern. 
While searching for evidence of deck stacking by administrative agencies in 
support of constituencies favored by Congress, Balla had to examine how agencies 
process information from comments.  In their treatment of comments made on a proposed 
rule concerning payment schedules for medical services, with comments made primarily 
by physicians and physician associations, the agency differentiates between those 
comments made by individual practitioners and those made by associations.  Comments 
are sorted, filed, and analyzed separately, even though many, if not all, practitioners are 
also members of those organizations making comments.  Similarly, Cuèllar observes that 
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agencies keep a count of all comments, even those that are obviously form letters 
initiated, and sometimes executed, by interest groups that make no effort to disguise their 
identity.  Dryly, he concludes that numbers count.   
From a vantage point at the advent of the Internet revolution, Fiorino (1990) finds 
difficult barriers to public participation embedded in the institutions of government.  He 
points to the issue of communicating technically complex material to the lay public in 
order to acquire their comments.  The process appears inherently biased against the lay 
public, which generally lacks the technical expertise necessary to fully understand the 
issues presented and make rational comments.  Fiorino concludes that low political 
awareness and lack of interest on the part of the public are really signs of deficiencies in 
institutions, not limitations on the public. 
However, over the past two decades, advances in computer technology and 
Internet access have allowed government agencies to dramatically increase the 
opportunities for public participation.  In an examination of state, local, and national 
government use of Internet technology, Darrell West (2004) describes the impact of e-
government initiatives as potentially transformative but still developing.  Governments 
tend to go through progressive stages in their transformation to e-government.  Initially, 
the government or agency web site serves as a billboard to advertise particular 
information selected by the originator.  Gradually, options for some forms of limited 
service delivery are added.  Later, agency web pages become portals, offering fully 
executable services and integrating offerings of various agencies or levels of government.  
In the final stage, governments facilitate interactive democracy with a variety of offerings 
including: e-mail; push technology to alert interested citizens to particular activities; 
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postings for comments and complaints; chat rooms, search features; options for the 
personalization of the web site; and, broadcasting government events.  Although more 
than half of Americans claim to have used a federal government web site, Darrell West 
(2004) found no significant relationship between such use and trust in government or 
assessments of government efficiency. 
An audit by the U. S. General Accounting Office (2003) finds that about two-
thirds of federal agency web sites allow citizens to make electronic comments on 
proposed rules.  An overlay web site (regulations.gov) is available to facilitate comments 
on most other proposed rules. Although noting numerous opportunities for improvement, 
the report optimistically forecasts that information technology could greatly facilitate the 
public's ability to make comments on proposed rules.   
Electronic rulemaking is a prominent element of Bill Clinton's National 
Performance Review.  Likewise, George W. Bush has emphasized using electronic 
rulemaking to create a more citizen-centered government.  Most interest groups report 
using it, but they rate it as less effective than other avenues of influence (Kerwin).  As a 
means of increasing effectiveness, some groups have turned to a novel technology.  
Emery and Emery (2005) find that some interest groups have developed software to take 
the salient points of their argument and disguise them in thousands of faux comments 
made in the names of association members, giving the impression of a groundswell of 
public support for the groups position.  As a countermeasure reminiscent of Cold War era 
spy versus spy thrillers, Emery and Emery recommend the development of agency 
software to scan all comments and identify main themes.  This would improve efficiency 
and assure the inclusion of important issues. 
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In spite of government's efforts to increase the transparency of its processes and 
facilitate public participation, the trend in American public opinion has been a decline in 
levels of confidence in the federal government.  Brooks and Cheng (2001) find only a 
small relationship between confidence in government and policy preferences, suggesting 
a crisis of legitimacy.  Based primarily on normative arguments, much of the recent 
scholarship in this area supports efforts to increase public participation in government 
decision-making in order to enhance legitimacy (Rosenbaum, 1976; Langton, 1978; 
Fiorino; Wamsley et al; Dahl, 1994; Richardson, 1997; McAvoy, 1999; Lovan, Murray, 
and Shaffer, 2004).   
 
Is It Public Participation Or Special Interest Politics? 
 
Lowi (1969) argues that exactly the opposite result is achieved.  Agency 
rulemaking moves policy making from politically accountable representatives of the 
people and resides it in a bureaucracy, arguably accountable to Congress, the courts, and 
the president (Meier, 1993; Peters, 2001).  Mashaw (1985) makes the point that such 
delegation of authority is, in itself, neither inappropriate constitutionally nor unattractive 
as an option in deciding policies with more than two possible alternatives.  But, when the 
participation of stakeholders in agency decisions is mandated, Lowi argues that the power 
to make public policy is parceled out to the most interested parties.  At that point, the 
ends of government and the justification of selecting one policy over another are no 
longer matters of public debate.  Cynicism and distrust of the political system result.  
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This undermines the credibility of incumbent policy-makers (Creig, Niemi, and Silver), 
and may ultimately undermine the legitimacy of government institutions (Easton, 1974). 
Lowi claims that direct interest group participation in policy has been accepted as 
self-government.  By allowing groups to work out their own compromises, politicians 
avoid conflict.  This creates the appearance that government does not have to be coercive.  
The primary requirement for fairness is accessibility of the system to all organized 
interests, with no judgment of their claims.  Public interest is merely the aggregation of 
the claims of various interest groups.  This system is based on three assumptions.  First, 
interest groups are homogeneous, easily defined, and accurately represented by their 
leadership.  Second, interest groups are ubiquitous and tend to balance other interest 
groups.  And third, government’s role is to assure access and ratify agreements among 
contenders (Lowi). 
The pluralist notion of politics focuses on the competition of various coalitions for 
public support, with the sum of these outcomes expressing the public interest.  But, why 
should the aggregation of any particular set of interests expressed through winning 
coalitions necessarily be the public interest?  Schattschneider defines the public interest 
as a general interest shared by substantially all members of a society.  The sum of the 
interests of a set of winning political coalitions specifically excludes the interests of non-
winning coalitions.  Likewise, it excludes the interests of the majority of citizens who are 
non-participants in this or that political turmoil.  Thus, pluralism results not in the public 
interest, but in some specific, if temporary, aggregation of special interests.  
Schattschneider defines a special interest as that interest shared by only a fraction of a 
society.  He notes that members of special interests exclude others and their interests may 
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be adverse to others’ interest.  However, special interests tend to rationalize their interests 
as public interests, and, in their public discourses, they state their interests in public 
terms. 
Contrasting the American pressure system to that of other nations, Black and 
Burke (1983) argue that America has progressed into a post-pluralist system.  Rather than 
a pluralist competition among groups, they find something resembling a European 
corporatist model.  They observe that many professional groups are granted virtually 
exclusive control of their policy areas.  The American Medical Association is specifically 
named as one such group and the American Bar Association might be another.  Often, 
these groups exercise a veto power over public policy proposals that might threaten their 
group interests.   
Likewise, Schlozman argues that, in terms of number and structure, business 
interests are over-represented in the American pressure system.  A utopian scheme for 
political equality would require that all citizens be equally active on all issues.  However, 
individuals vary in political resources such as time, money, skills, and contacts.  
Therefore, differences in rates of participation occur which do not represent differences 
in intensity of preferences.  She asserts that this overrepresentation of business comes at 
the expense of groups representing broad public interests and the poor.  She uses census 
data to demonstrate that the number of interest groups by type does not match the 
percentage of the population she assigns to those interests.  Schlozman qualifies the 
charge of bias with the recognition that many powerful segments of the population such 
as mature, white males are not represented as separate interests.   
28 
  
 
Similarly, Schlozman notes that the explosion in the growth of public interest 
groups has been offset by the growth of professional associations and individual 
corporations as interest groups.  Also, business and professional groups tend to last 
longer than public interest groups.  There has been a decline in the number of civic and 
foreign policy interest groups and an increase in environmental and consumer groups.  
The stability in the number of union groups as other groups have increased nets a 
decrease in the influence of unions.  Although the units of the pressure system do not 
have equal influence, the advantage of business in number is augmented by its control of 
greater resources.   
But the multiplicity of voices from the business community may be less of a 
chorus than a cacophony.  Fritschler (1989) observes that one reason for the involvement 
of business in so much of agency decision-making is that most government regulation has 
come at the behest of those businesses being regulated.  Regulation provides a stability 
that is generally lacking in the market.  Also, Mancur Olson (1965) points out that 
business lobbies are organized by industry, producing a number of small, oligarchic units 
that may effectively lobby for issues affecting their particular fiefdom.  While small 
pressure groups tend to exert greater policy influence because of their ability to organize 
effectively and control the distribution of rewards, business has limited influence on 
broad national concerns.  This is because business, as a whole, is not well organized. 
During the past sixty years, Congress has delegated more rulemaking power to 
executive agencies and provided for greater public information and public access to the 
rulemaking process.  Beginning with the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 
Congress has expanded opportunities through the Freedom of Information Act, the 
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Privacy Act, the Government In the Sunshine Act, the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 
the Negotiated Rulemaking Act, and the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Act,.  
One result of these efforts has been the growth of interest groups, especially those 
centered in Washington, D. C. and focused on influencing agency rulemaking (Kerwin).  
Both Schlozman and Putnam observe the trend of new membership organizations to be 
centered in the nation's capitol.  Schlozman notes that many Washington-based pressure 
groups have no individual members.  Putnam estimates that more than half of modern 
associations are professionally staffed advocacy groups with no individual members.  In a 
study of nature advocacy organizations, Basso (2003) observes: 
The professional advocacy organizations that operate in the national and 
international policy arenas are not really looking for activist members in 
the classical sense, nor would they know what to do with these people if 
they had them.  It may be cynical to say so, but of what use are 'members' 
when lawyers, scientists, and policy experts are far more valuable in day-
to-day policy debates at the national and international levels of discourse?  
The emergence of 'virtual membership' via the Internet only reinforces the 
perspective that members as such are little more than organizational 
wallpaper, a collective backdrop for professional advocacy (p. 410). 
 
Associations calling themselves citizen's groups tend to be mere mailing list 
organizations, with the membership function limited to making contributions.  Putnam 
describes the modern mailing list groups as tertiary organizations in which members may 
share common ideals and symbols without developing ties to each other.  Movements 
based on symbolic identification rather than personal networks tend to experience high 
membership volatility.  These members are principally recruited through direct mail.  
Commitment is low, members participate in fewer activities, and recruits hold more 
extreme and intolerant political views than members of movements that rely on social 
networks. 
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Is Participation an Expression of Self-Interest or Symbolic Interest, and Does It 
Matter? 
 
When the Founders of the American republic designed a government based on the 
realities of human nature, they expected that the greatest proportion of citizens would 
pursue their self-interest, giving only infrequent attention to public matters (Richardson 
and Nigro).  While virtuous activity is an essential part of the good life, political 
participation is not essential to virtuous activity.  Family and friendships provide ample 
opportunities to develop and express virtuosity.  So, while government might need the 
virtuous citizen's participation to function properly, the virtuous citizen does not need 
opportunities to participate in government (Mulgan, 1990).  In the early days of the 
republic, government was small and most problems were resolved by those most directly 
affected, without recourse to politicians or agencies.  During his visit to America in the 
1830s, Tocqueville observed: 
The citizen of the United States is taught from infancy to rely upon his 
own exertions in order to resist the evils and the difficulties of life; he 
looks upon the social authority with an eye of mistrust and anxiety, and he 
claims its assistance only when he is unable to do without it. ... The same 
spirit pervades every act of social life. If a stoppage occurs in a 
thoroughfare and the circulation of vehicles is hindered, the neighbors 
immediately form themselves into a deliberative body; and this 
extemporaneous assembly gives rise to an executive power which 
remedies the inconvenience before anybody has thought of recurring to a 
pre-existing authority superior to that of the persons immediately 
concerned (p. 191).  
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Of course, the problems faced by contemporary Americans are much more 
complex than getting a wagon out of a ditch.  But, the same self-interest that moved 
society from self-reliance toward a complex administrative state in the 1930s appears to 
be pushing us in another direction today.  Weissberg (2003) attributes the current trend 
toward privatization, which tends to diminish the public sphere, to the public's perception 
that public and private strategies for handling problems may be interchangeable:   
Unlike academics preoccupied with heightened civic activism, ordinary 
citizens have long grasped the fungibility of private and collective 
strategies.  It's purely a matter of practical circumstances - if noisy rallies 
to secure improved police protection fail, hire private guards or buy a gun.  
In fact, a personalized 'do-it-yourself' solution is quite reasonable given a 
gridlocked system in which even simple policy changes may take years 
and require assembling unwieldy coalitions (p. 387). 
 
So, political participation is not merely a choice of acting or not acting.  It also 
represents an individual's choice of a political act over other potential non-political acts.  
Putnam finds that, in spite of the general decline in associations, self-help groups are on 
the rise.  He notes that self-help groups are the only type of groups that are not associated 
with higher levels of social capital.  Perhaps this is because self-help group members are 
acting privately on matters that they consider important to their interests, rather than 
waiting for an association to move government to solve their problem.  Making a 
comment to a proposed agency rule would be an example of choosing a political act to 
solve a problem, perhaps even the same kind of problem addressed by other citizens 
through self-help groups.  Citizens are more likely to participate in political acts when the 
interest of the community is demonstrably linked to the interest of the individual 
(Leighley ; Burtt,1993; Richardson).   
32 
  
 
But not all research points toward such rational choice explanations of 
participation.  Whiteley (1995) finds that while rational choice theory explains low-cost 
activities like voting, expressive concerns and a sense of collective efficacy are the most 
significant influence in explaining high-cost activities, like campaigning.  Similarly, in an 
extensive study of political activists, Schlozman, Verba, and Brady (1995) find 
expressive concerns to be the primary driver of most types of political participation.   
The debate over self-interest and expressive motivations of political participation 
has produced substantial controversy among academics, culminating in a series of articles 
and answers between the spokesmen of the opposing views, each challenging the 
methodology of the other.  Writing for the proponents of expressive concerns, which he 
terms the symbolic politics view, Davis Sears (1997) notes that experimental studies of 
the impact of self-interest on decision-making have usually resulted in stronger 
relationships than studies which utilize survey methodology.  He notes several problems 
with experimental studies of self-interest.  First, the population of experimental studies is 
normally composed of undergraduate college students and the settings are artificial.  
Secondly, these studies usually focus of common and well-understood aspects of the 
students' daily life, which could be decided on a relatively simple cost-benefit 
calculation.  Finally, the subjective evaluation of self-interest may be nothing more than 
an after-the-fact justification for an attitude.  He contrasts these problems with survey 
studies, which usually sample the general population by telephone in their homes.  
Evaluations of self-interest are determined objectively.  However, the subject of the 
inquiry normally involves complex questions about which the respondent has less 
knowledge and in which he has a smaller stake. 
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Writing for rational choice advocates, Crano (1997) criticizes an earlier study by 
Sears, Hensler, and Speer (1979) for insistence on attitudinal homogeneity among all 
levels of vested interest.  For example, a variable measuring opposition to bussing to 
achieve racial balance in schools is used as the indicator of self-interest among Whites, 
when only a very small percentage of survey respondents had children in schools affected 
by a court order requiring bussing.  Crano argues that a fair test of the effects of vested 
interest in matters of public policy must include three elements.  First, there must be a 
measure of how the policy will impact the respondent’s life, preferably self-reported.  
Second, there must be a reliable scale for measuring symbolic attitude.  Finally, the study 
must measure action on a policy-relevant issue, preferably using an index constructed 
from a number of questions concerning aspects of that issue.   
Leighley observes that the debate between proponents of rational choice 
explanations of participation and those arguing for expressive incentives turns on 
questions of operationalization of the variables and to the value accorded to post hoc 
justifications provided by participants.  He concludes that while the chance of affecting 
public policy decisions is likely to be substantially higher for elites, collective political 
action may not appear rational for ordinary citizens because of the limited chance of 
success.   
Contacting a government official, a political behavior similar but not identical to 
making a comment on a proposed agency rule, is a political act that has been evaluated in 
the context of material and symbolic interest.  Although finding strong support for non-
material motivations in most types of political activities, Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 
find that those subjects whose act of participation is contacting a government official 
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identify material reasons as their chief motivation.  Moon, Serra, and West (1993) find 
that citizens most frequently contact their representatives to seek help with specific 
problems.  Likewise, in a study of more than two thousand citizen-initiated contacts with 
municipal officials in Cincinnati, Ohio, Thomas (1982) finds that the ends of this type of 
political participation tend to be instrumental and needs driven.  Political efficacy acts as 
a booster for the more advantaged and as a damper for the least advantaged.  Thomas 
contrasts two competing models of participation, finding each inadequate to explain 
citizen-initiated contacts.  First, the socioeconomic model predicts that contacts will 
increase as socioeconomic status increases.  A second model predicts that rates of 
contacting will be distributed in a parabola between the vectors of high and low needs 
and awareness.  Study data fail to support either prediction.  Thomas offers a clientele 
model to explain the distribution of citizen-initiated contacts.  According to this model, 
the driving impetus for a citizen-initiated contact is the citizen's perceived need for 
service from a particular agency.  Secondarily, attitudes and information either stimulate 
or impede that impetus.  Thomas (1982) concludes: 
A citizen who contacts a government agency usually seeks (1) a relatively 
specific response (2) in the very immediate future ...  By contrast, an 
individual involved in some traditional form of political participation (e.g., 
voting, campaigning) usually has policy ends that are much less specific 
with their achievement not expected so quickly (pp. 504-5). 
 
This debate between proponents of material and symbolic motivations involves 
more than mere methodological controversy.  If political motivations stem from 
individual-level calculations of material interests, government actions contrary to those 
interests constitute an injury that may require compensation of some sort.  If motivations 
reflect only political symbolism, then the dominant political regime might educate 
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disaffected individuals to the politically correct values (Sears, Hensler, and Speer).  For 
example, McAvoy finds that when citizen participants object to the siting of a hazardous 
waste facility, those objections may be overcome through accommodations and 
incentives.  Had the objections been purely symbolic, there would be no reason to expect 
that material incentives would provide appropriate compensation.  Also, motivations may 
be mixed.  Oliver (1999) finds civic participation low in high-income homogeneous 
urban communities.  He attributes the low levels of civic activity to little need for 
government services, a material motivation, and a general agreement on goals, indicating 
a symbolic motivation. 
 
 
Normative Theories of Citizen Participation 
 
Not all contacts between citizens and government officials are without negative 
intent or outcome.  In a study of public opposition to radioactive waste sites, Kraft and 
Clary (1991) observe that citizen participation in agency decision-making may lead to 
community opposition and political stalemate.  Among the reasons for increased 
community resistance they identified: new environmental values; fear of technological 
risks; a dramatic increase in the information available to the general public; less trust in 
government and industry; and, statutory requirements for the inclusion of the public in 
administrative processes.  Likewise, Lovan, Murray, and Shaffer identify several 
potential negative consequences of public participation including delays in reaching 
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decisions, issue capture by unrepresentative interest groups, focusing on trivial issues, 
and loss of confidence in decision-makers when efforts are not perceived as successful. 
In another study of citizen participation in public budget making, Simonsen and 
Robbins (2000) find that those who favor an expansive role for government would be 
better served by limiting budget information and citizen participation in the budgeting 
process.  When citizens perceive themselves as customers of public goods rather than 
participants in a cooperative effort, there is a decline in support for government services.  
Simonsen and Robbins note that by engaging a discrete group of citizens in the budget 
process and providing them with adequate financial information to make informed 
decisions, those citizens are made less representative of the public they were selected to 
represent. 
A third study of public participation, Rohrbaugh and Wehr (1978) point out the 
difficulty of determining citizen preferences, even in a small, relatively homogeneous 
rural community.  They conclude that it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine the 
true preferences on complex public policy questions of even a single individual due to the 
nature of the human cognitive process.  Human judgment is complex, covert, and 
inconsistent.  Likewise, it can be reported only subjectively and introspectively, with 
priorities and tradeoffs seldom accurately described by the decision-maker.  This is 
further complicated by the likelihood that citizens may over-dramatize their positions on 
one or more single issues, thereby decreasing the possibility of compromise across even 
relatively small polities.   
Even more ominous is the potential for citizen participation causing harm to the 
participants.  Morrell (1999) finds that when citizen's views may be attributed to them, 
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peer criticism may be directed at those opinions and at the individual responsible for 
them.  Identification with unpopular or politically incorrect ideas may lead to 
chastisement or other negative incentives, reducing the likelihood of further participation 
by the person receiving the chastisement or by others of like mind who observe her 
treatment.  Morrell recommends that discourse be structured to preserve the anonymity of 
the participant.  However, that would violate the democratic goal of transparency in the 
public decision-making process. 
But not all of the potential problems lie with the citizen participants.  Public 
officials are not above using public participation to accomplish agency ends.  In 
analyzing the impact of public hearings on General Revenue Sharing decisions and 
behavior, Cole and Caputo (1984) conclude that while hearings had an immediate, short-
term impact on both behavior and public interest, the long-term effects were insignificant.  
More ominously, they muse,  “Unfortunately, rather than opening the process of 
administration to public involvement, the public hearing may permit sanctioned isolation 
of agencies and agency officials seeking as little program and policy change as possible” 
(p. 415).  More to the point, Thomas (1995) cautions public officials that when public 
acceptance of a decision is most important, more public participation in decision-making 
is appropriate.  However, when the quality of the decision is most important, less public 
participation is appropriate. 
The foregoing sections have explored and elaborated theories of the drivers of 
political participation, the nature of participation in the notice and comment process, the 
role of interest groups in the pressure system, motivations for participation in pressure 
politics, and normative theories of citizen participation.  From these theoretical views, 
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this study progresses to a discussion of the methodological concerns in the next chapter.  
First, the selection of the sample of notice and comment participants is described.  Then, 
the hypotheses to be tested are articulated and the variables used to test these are 
presented.  Subsequent chapters cover testing hypotheses, presenting additional 
descriptive data, and drawing conclusions.   
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Chapter 3 
Methodology 
 
 
The previous chapter presents theories that are the product of prior research in the 
area of citizen participation.  In this section, those theories are applied to the hypotheses 
that will be tested using Citizen Participation Study data.  First, the data sources are 
explained.  Next, hypotheses are stated.  Finally, technical aspects of testing procedures 
and data presentation are elaborated. 
Since this study proposes to evaluate the representativeness of notice and 
comment participants, the characteristics of the general public must be determined.  I use 
the 2004 American National Election Study (ANES) for this purpose.  This study is 
selected because processing of the 2006 ANES survey had not been completed at the time 
of polling for this study.  The 2004 ANES uses face-to-face interviews with 1,212 pre-
election respondents and 1,066 post-election respondents (Center for Political Studies, 
2004).  Twenty-six specific questions contained in the ANES questionnaire are used to 
identify characteristics of the survey respondents.   
Given the importance of federal rulemaking to our complex regulatory state, there 
has been relatively little research done on the participants in this essential process.  For 
many years, research into the notice and comment (N&C) process has been limited 
because access to information concerning participants in this process was quite difficult.  
Paper records were stored in agency offices, usually in Washington, D.C., but sometimes 
in even less convenient locations.  However, recent advances in electronic access to 
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government agency databases open a vast and relatively unplowed field for academic 
research (Coglianese, Shapiro, and Balla, 2005).  Several agencies maintain fairly large 
archives of comments on current and past proposals.  Since the rule proposals are issued 
by different agencies using somewhat different processes for securing participation, 
receive different levels of media and interest group attention, concern different types of 
issues, and receive comments from throughout the nation, a relatively large and diverse 
pool of known political participants is available.  From this pool, the sample used in this 
study is drawn. 
 
Sample Selection 
 
Questions similar to those contained in the ANES survey were asked of 400 N&C 
participants in a survey mailed on April 10, 2007.  A copy of the survey instrument is 
provided in Appendix A.  Approximately 100 subjects were randomly selected from 
those individuals offering comments to each of four particular notices of proposed 
rulemaking.  Random selection of rule proposals is inappropriate because most rule 
proposals attract few, if any, comments by individuals acting as private citizens.   
So, three factors influenced the selection of a particular notice of proposed 
rulemaking (NPRM) for this study.  First, the number of comments made by private 
citizens has to be sufficiently large to provide a reasonable pool of candidates for the 
survey.  A threshold level of 500 comments from individuals is established to meet this 
criterion.  Secondly, the comments must be made fairly recently.  America has a mobile 
population.  Since the addresses of commenters are not updated after submission, the 
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longer the interval between the comment and the survey, the lower the response rate.  
Therefore, the pool of commenters is restricted to those between January 1, 2005 and 
June 30, 2006.  Finally, since an important aspect of this study is the impact of e-
rulemaking on citizen participation, only those NPRMs accessible to e-comments are 
considered.  Data for these NPRMs are available through either the agency website or 
regulations.gov.  It should be noted that while the overwhelming majority of these 
comments are made through e-comments or e-mail, not all comments to the NPRMs are 
submitted electronically.  Some comments are made through traditional means and are 
subsequently scanned into the electronic database of comments.  However, even if the 
comment is not made via an electronic option, information about the NPRM and a wealth 
of data relating to the proposed rule are available on-line.  Since it would not be possible 
to determine which particular commenters use on-line information, all individual 
commenters are included in the pool.  Seven NPRMs meet all of these criteria.  However, 
four of the seven are generated by a single entity, the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA).  Three of these environmental NPRMs have been eliminated.  While this may 
understate the magnitude of environmentalists in the mix of individual citizen 
commenters, it allows a more balanced look at participants from a variety of issue areas.   
 
Selection of Rule Proposals 
 
The remaining NPRM promulgated by the EPA is EPA-HQ-TRI-2005-0071.  It is 
selected because it has more comments than other candidates from the EPA.  Like most 
proposed rules, this NPRM is the most recent step in a long and complex regulatory 
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process.  In the language of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know 
Act (EPCRA), Congress granted to the EPA broad discretionary power to establish and 
alter reporting requirements for certain toxic chemicals that are used, stored, or passed 
through a facility.  Currently, the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) tracks 30 chemical 
categories and 531 specific chemicals.  Depending on the type and quantity of toxic 
chemicals involved, different methods of reporting are required.  Based on the estimates 
of an outside consulting firm, Form R which is required for larger quantities or more 
toxic chemicals takes roughly one and one-half times as long to complete as Form A, 
used for smaller quantities or less toxic chemicals (Environmental Protection Agency, 
2005).   
As part of its mandate from Congress, the EPA is required to periodically review 
its regulations to determine if agency goals may be accomplished in a less burdensome 
manner.  This review began with a Stakeholder Dialogue sponsored by the EPA that 
lasted from November, 2002, through February, 2004.  Such a dialogue is actually a long 
period of comment used during an early phase in the rulemaking process.  Agency 
records indicate that a total of 770 comments were received with sixty-three percent 
coming from individuals, sixteen percent from environmental groups, fifteen percent 
from industry, and six percent from government agencies (Environmental Protection 
Agency).   
Based on this feedback, the EPA determined to improve the process through three 
initiatives.  One involves eliminating some reporting items by utilizing information 
already stored in agency data files.  Another reduces the frequency of some TRI reports.  
Most changes involve changing the requirement for annual reporting to biannual 
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reporting.  The change proposed on EPA-HQ-TRI-2005-0071 allows the use of a simpler 
form of reporting for some less toxic chemicals that presently require more complex 
reporting (Environmental Protection Agency). 
Because three separate initiatives are being undertaken in roughly the same time 
period, opponents to change, primarily environmental groups, link the three in their 
comments.  The relatively small change proposed on this NPRM is routinely described by 
commenters as a means of reducing the information available to the public.  However, the 
language of the proposed rule indicates that it merely changes which form will be used 
for the reporting.  Likewise, it should be noted that the proposed changes do not 
dramatically impact the bottom line of the firms seeking the changes.  The EPA estimates 
that in the worst case, reporting time will be reduced from 67 hours per report for the 
more complex form to 45.6 hours for the less complex form.  Even if the firm used a 
fairly large number of TRI chemicals, it is doubtful that the savings would be critical to 
the firm's survival (Environmental Protection Agency).  The insistence of 
environmentalists on no changes, even inconsequential changes, would seem to indicate 
that participants are more influenced by symbolic than material motives.   
The second NPRM selected for this study, APHIS-2005-0063, was initiated by a 
petition from an affected interest group and proposes rules for the transportation and sale 
of domestic ferrets.  In March, 2004, the International Ferret Congress (IFC), in 
conjunction with one veterinarian and six ferret shelter or support groups, petitioned the 
Department of Agriculture to establish standards for the care and handling of domestic 
ferrets under authority delegated to that agency under the Animal Welfare Act (AWA).  
This law gives the Secretary of Agriculture the option of using a general standard or 
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establishing a specific standard for any type of animal except birds, laboratory mice, and 
domestic farm animals used for normal agricultural purposes.  Currently, domestic ferrets 
fall under the general standard.  Petitioners claim that ferret kits (young) are taken from 
their mothers too soon and improperly caged and fed.  These deficiencies result in both 
physical impairment of the young ferrets and a tendency to exhibit aggressive behavior.  
Purchasers of the ferret kits are unable or unwilling to cope with these problems and a 
disproportionate number of ferrets end up in shelters (Department of Agriculture, Animal 
and Plant Health Inspection Service, 2005). 
The web site of the IFC provides a link to a page containing information on the 
proposed rule along with detailed instructions for making a comment either via the 
Internet or conventional mail.  Also, technical information and lists of key points are 
provided along with several letters from sympathizers.  For the less articulate supporters, 
a letter authored by the American Ferret Association is provided.  This requires the 
concerned citizen to merely copy the letter, print her name and address, and sign the 
letter.  Of course, four copies are required by agency standards (International Ferret 
Congress, 2006).  It is anticipated that comments on this rule will be limited to a rather 
insular community of persons and organizations that own, shelter, breed, service, or sell 
ferrets.  However, these material motivations may be mixed with symbolic attachments to 
the concept of animal rights. 
The third rule selected for this study is NPRM FAA-2004-17005, which proposes 
rules to limit the ability of small aircraft to operate in specific airspaces around 
Washington, D. C.  Subsequent to the terrorist attacks in 2001, the Departments of 
Defense and Homeland Security designated certain parts of the airspace in and around the 
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nation's capitol as no-fly zones.  These restrictions were seen as necessary to protect vital 
national assets in the area.  Subsequently, service to the Reagan International Airport by 
large commercial aircraft and certain corporate aircraft was allowed to resume but 
restrictions on the smaller general aviation aircraft remained in effect.  Use of three 
proximate general aviation airports was restricted and owners and pilots must undergo 
extensive vetting before receiving a personal identification number necessary for all 
landings or take-offs.  All aircraft operating in a wider designated area must use a coded 
transponder for identification and maintain radio contact with designated control facilities 
(Department of Transportation, 2007).   
These restrictions are understandably unpopular with general aviation owners and 
pilots in the region and their material motivations are clear.  Even minor violations of 
rules may result in severe fines and/or loss of licensing.  More severe violations could 
lead to the in-air destruction of the aircraft and occupants (Aircraft Owners and Pilots 
Association, 2006).  Agencies responsible for intercepting and destroying hostile aircraft 
agree that the current airspace restrictions are the minimum required for national security 
reasons.  The proposed rule serves to codify these restrictions, effectively making them 
permanent (Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration). 
The final NPRM selected for this study addresses a different national security 
issue.  NPRM USCBP-2005-0005 seeks input on possible alternatives to requiring 
American citizens who re-enter the United States from Canada, Mexico, and Bermuda to 
present a passport as identification.  The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) requires 
all United States citizens and nonimmigrant aliens to present passports as identification 
when entering the United States.  That law allows the Secretary of State and Secretary of 
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Homeland Security to jointly waive the requirement for nonimmigrant aliens and the 
Secretary of State to unilaterally waive it for U. S. citizens.  Up until this point, U. S. 
citizens and nonimmigrant citizens of Canada, Mexico, and Bermuda were allowed to use 
driver's licenses, birth certificates, and other photographic identification cards issued for 
that purpose when entering the United States from any point in the Western Hemisphere 
other than Cuba (Department of Homeland Security, Bureau of Customs and Border 
Protection, 2005).  
However, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Reduction Act of 2004 
terminated the discretion of the Secretary of State in such matters and required all persons 
entering the United States to provide a passport as identification.  Some discretion 
remained.  The law required the Secretary of Homeland Security to specify what 
documents may be used in lieu of a passport when entering the United States after 
January 1, 2008 (Department of Homeland Security, Bureau of Customs and Border 
Protection).  Most Americans may never feel the impact of this rule.  However, cross-
border commuters, those who frequently travel on business to these countries, and those 
with family or friends there are certain to feel the loss of what has been for many years a 
special privilege.  The material motivations of respondents are clear in their comments, 
most of which express a desire to avoid paying for a passport. 
In sum, the four NPRMs selected address issues that are important to their 
communities of interest but none of these communities are likely to overlap excessively.  
Likewise, there is a reasonable mix of those actuated by material concerns and those 
expressing symbolic concerns.  Geographically, persons concerned with the reporting of 
toxic chemicals and protection of ferrets would not be expected to have any particular 
47 
  
 
geographic concentration.  Washington, D. C., and points of entry from Canada, Mexico, 
and Bermuda are more discrete geographically, but they are widely dispersed from each 
other.  Also, individuals traveling to those destinations come from across the nation.  So, 
in aggregate, these NPRMs are expected to provide a diverse pool of N&C participants, 
both in terms of issues and geography.   
Each pool of NPRM respondents forms a cluster.  For each cluster, random 
numbers were generated encompassing the range of the docket numbers of comments 
(Creswell, 1994).  Documents matching each random number were examined to 
determine that the comment is from an individual, that a complete mailing address in the 
United States is provided, and that the individual has not been previously selected for 
inclusion, since many participants make multiple comments.  If all criteria are met, that 
name and address is added to the pool of polling subjects.  Approximately one hundred 
subjects are selected from each NPRM in order to avoid excessive influence of any 
particular cluster.  The survey documents are similar but coded to indicate from which 
NPRM the subject was selected.  A total of one hundred forty one responses were 
received by May 14, 2007, for a response rate of slightly more than thirty five percent.  
This survey is referred to as the 2007 Citizen Participation Study (CPS).  Throughout this 
study, CPS respondents are used as a surrogate for all N&C participants.   
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Hypotheses 
 
Table 3.1  
Demographic and Socioeconomic Variables 
ANES Variable Description 
V043249A  Year of birth 
V043251 Marital status 
V043252 Highest grade of school or year of college completed 
V043293X Household income 
V043299 Race 
V041109A Gender 
  
A number of previous studies have described those who have the higher levels of 
wealth, social status, and education as the more likely to participate in political activity 
(Verba and Nie; Rosenstone and Hansen; Leighley; Lijphart; Putnam).  The six variables 
that deal with demographic and socioeconomic variables are displayed in Table 3.1 
above.  The data for these variables will be used to test the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1 The mean age of CPS respondents is higher than 
that of the general public. 
 
Hypothesis 2 CPS respondents are more likely to be married 
than the general public. 
 
Hypothesis 3 CPS respondents are better educated than the 
general public. 
 
Hypothesis 4 CPS respondents have higher household incomes 
than the general public. 
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Hypothesis 5 CPS respondents are more likely to be White 
than the general public. 
 
Hypothesis 6 CPS respondents are more likely to be male than 
the general public. 
 
 
Table 3.2  
Organizational Membership 
ANES Variable Description 
V045170 Membership in a nonreligious organization 
V045170A Number of nonreligious associations 
  
Voluntary participationn in a variety of civic and social groups is associated with 
political participation (Putnam; Ayala).  Table 3.2 above displays the two variables gauge 
relative levels of organizational membership.  These variables will be used to test two 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 7 CPS respondents are more likely to belong to 
nonreligious associations than the general 
public. 
 
Hypothesis 8 CPS respondents who are members of 
nonreligious organizations belong to more 
associations than the members of the general 
public who are association members. 
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Table 3.3  
Information Sources 
ANES Variable Description 
V043014 Days during past week  watched the national news on television  
V043016* Days during past week  watched the local news on television  
V043017* Nights during past week  watched the local news on television  
V043019 Days during past week read local newspaper 
V045155 Internet access 
* Combined to reflect the total number of days watched local news 
 
The media plays an important role in forming perceptions of one's political 
environment (Ranney; Popkin; Putnam).  Also, Internet use is associated with 
participation in high-cost political behaviors (Bimber).  Four study variables investigate 
the respondent's access to and frequency of use of various media sources.  These four 
variables will be used to test the following hypotheses concerning information sources: 
 
Hypothesis 9 CPS respondents watch national news on 
television more frequently than the general 
public. 
 
Hypothesis 10 CPS respondents watch local news on 
television more frequently than the general 
public. 
 
Hypothesis 11 CPS respondents read a daily newspaper more 
frequently than the general public. 
 
Hypothesis 12 CPS respondents are more likely to have 
Internet access than the general public. 
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Table 3.4  
Measures of Political Participation 
ANES Variable Description 
V045167 Contacting a government official  
V045168 Attendance at a community meeting  
V045153 Talking politics with family or friends 
V045154 Listening to political talk radio 
V045010 Talking with people to influence their voting decision 
V045011 Attend political gatherings 
V045012 Display campaign buttons, stickers, or signs 
V045014 Make contributions to individual candidates 
V045015 Make contributions to a political party 
V045016 Make contributions to group that supports candidates 
V045017A Voting 
 
Research indicates that social, civic and political participation predicts more 
political participation (Dahl, 1989; Verba, Schlozman, Brady, and Nie; Putnam).  The 
next set of variables looks directly at various types of political participation behaviors.  
The categories of response are yes or no and all questions are identical in both surveys.  
The primary difference is that the ANES variables refer to the 2004 election cycle and the 
CPS variables refer to the 2006 election cycle.  The variables presented above in Table 
3.4 are used to compare the CPS respondents to the general public in political activities 
other than their particular comment to a proposed agency rule.  This set of eleven 
variables will be used to examine the level of political activity of CPS respondents other 
than making comments to proposed rules by testing the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 13 CPS respondents are more likely than the 
general public to call, write, or visit a 
government official to express their views. 
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Hypothesis 14 CPS respondents are more likely than the 
general public to attend a community meeting 
to discuss an issue. 
 
Hypothesis 15 CPS respondents are more likely than the 
general public to discuss politics with family or 
friends. 
 
Hypothesis 16 CPS respondents are more likely than the 
general public to listen to political talk radio. 
 
Hypothesis 17 CPS respondents are more likely than the 
general public to try to influence the votes of 
others. 
 
Hypothesis 18 CPS respondents are more likely than the 
general public to attend political meetings, 
rallies, speeches, or similar events. 
 
Hypothesis 19 CPS respondents are more likely than the 
general public to use campaign buttons, 
stickers, or signs. 
 
Hypothesis 20 CPS respondents are more likely than the 
general public to give money to political 
candidates. 
 
Hypothesis 21 CPS respondents are more likely than the 
general public to make contributions to a 
political party. 
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Hypothesis 22 CPS respondents are more likely than the 
general public to contribute to a group that 
supports or opposes candidates. 
 
Hypothesis 23 CPS respondents are more likely than the 
general public to vote. 
 
Table 3.5  
Efficacy and Trust 
ANES Variable Description 
V045202 People like me have little influence on government 
V045204 Elections make government pay attention to the views of the people 
V045198  Government is run by a few big interests 
 
The final three variables address the issues of trust in government and political 
efficacy.  These particular questions are used because they relate most directly to 
participation in the notice and comment process.  The first relates to what Creig, Niemi, 
and Silver would call external efficacy while the second and third address trust in 
government institutions.  If issue politics resemble ethnic politics, those with high 
efficacy and low trust would be expected to be among the most active (Guterbock and 
London).  All CPS questions and answer categories are identical to those used for the 
ANES variables.  Respondents are asked if they agree or disagree with particular 
statements.  The following hypotheses are used to test relationship of trust and efficacy to 
the N&C process: 
 
Hypothesis 24 CPS respondents are less likely than the general 
public to agree with the statement that people 
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like themselves do not have any say in what 
government does. 
 
Hypothesis 25 CPS respondents are less likely than the general 
public to agree with the statement that elections 
make government pay attention to what the 
people think. 
 
Hypothesis 26 CPS respondents are more likely than the 
general public to view the government as being 
controlled by special interests.   
 
Data Presentation 
 
In general, data for the hypotheses to be tested are either categorical or 
continuous.  All categorical data are analyzed using cross-tabulation and chi-square tests 
for statistical significance.  Only the Pearson chi-square is reported.  Norusis (1997) 
argues that this is sufficient in most cases and that the appropriateness of the Fisher's 
Exact Test for two by two tables is an matter of "... controversy among statisticians..." (p. 
305).  In all cases involved in this study, the use of Pearson's chi-square does not change 
the outcome from that calculated using more restrictive assumptions.  Combined sample 
and subgroup cross-tabulation tables are presented in the text of Chapter 4 and chi-square 
tables are presented in Appendix B. 
Continuous data are analyzed using independent samples t-tests when comparing 
the means of the ANES and CPS samples.   When CPS data are divided into subgroups, 
one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) is used and, if differences in means are found to 
be statistically significant, a Dunnett's C multiple comparison is calculated to determine 
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which issue groups are significant contributors.  The calculation of homogeneity of 
variance for subgroups is not reported due to the similarity of issue group sizes.  Norusis 
states, "In practice, if the number of cases in each of the groups is similar, the equality of 
variance assumption is not too important" (p. 261).  Combined sample and subgroup 
tables of group statistics are presented in the text of Chapter 4 and all other tables are 
contained in Appendix B. 
In addition to the variables necessary to test these hypotheses, the CPS survey 
document includes a series of questions concerning technical aspects of the process of 
making comments and participant behaviors.  No hypotheses are tested for these 
variables due to a deficiency of theory in the areas addressed.  These variables address 
information adequacy, interest group involvement, other political efforts, prior comments 
on proposed rules, the method of making the comment, and the relative difficulty of the 
comment process.  In addition to providing valuable information for agencies engaged in 
the N&C process, this data provides additional insights into some of the results of 
hypothesis testing.  This data is presented in Chapter 5.   
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Chapter 4 
 
Data and Analysis 
 
 
In this chapter, the hypotheses stated in the previous chapter are tested.  Based on 
previous research presented in the literature review, it is anticipated that CPS respondents 
will score higher in socioeconomic indicators, have greater associational linkage, utilize 
more information sources, and participate in more political activities, both high and low 
cost.  This investigation begins with an examination demographic and socioeconomic 
indicators of citizen participation. 
 
Demographic and Socioeconomic Indicators 
 
Table 4.1 
Group Statistics for Age  
 
 
Sample/Subgroup 
 
Number 
 
Mean 
Standard. 
Deviation 
Standard. 
Error Mean 
ANES 1200 47.21 17.18 .50 
CPS 139 53.36 13.29 1.13 
Animal Rights 25 45.52 12.45 2.49 
Aircraft Over DC 36 50.86 12.24 2.04 
Re-entry Documents 38 57.79 12.79 2.08 
Toxic Chemicals 40 56.30 12.90 2.04 
 
Hypothesis 1 states that CPS respondents are older than the general public.  Age 
data are continuous.  A summary of group statistics presented in Table 4.1 above indicate 
that the mean age for CPS respondents is more than six years older than the mean age for 
ANES respondents.  A t-test presented in Table B.1a in Appendix B indicates that the 
equality of variance assumption has been violated.  The t-statistic for equal variances not 
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assumed is significant, indicating that there is less than one chance in one thousand that 
the difference in the means of the ANES and CPS samples occurred by chance.  This 
evidence supports the hypothesis that the mean for people who participate in the notice 
and comment process is higher than the mean of the general public.   
Because the CPS data indicate to which rule the respondent made a comment, the 
data are divided into subgroups in order to test the robustness of the findings for the 
entire sample.  The Animal Rights subgroup actually has a lower age mean than the 
ANES sample.  However, all other CPS subgroups exceed the age mean for the ANES 
sample.  The data reveal what appears to be a substantial difference in means between the 
subgroups.  The difference between the highest and lowest subgroup age means is twice 
the difference in the ANES and CPS samples.  A one-way analysis of variance test is 
utilized to determine the impact of differences in issue group means.  Results of this 
analysis, presented below in Table B.1b in Appendix B indicate that differences in 
subgroup means are statistically significant at the .001 level.  There is only one 
possibility in one thousand that the differences occurred by chance.  A multiple 
comparison of subgroup means displayed in Table B.1c.in Appendix B shows that three 
of the means of the issue groups differ significantly.  Only the Aircraft Over DC 
subgroup is close enough to the other subgroup means to avoid a significant difference.  
So, while age is generally related positively to participation in the N&C process, the 
subject matter of the proposed rule change affects the mean age for particular sets of 
commenters.  This number and level of differences undermines support for the hypothesis 
on age.   
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The next demographic variable to be considered is marital status.  Hypothesis 2 
states that commenters on proposed federal rules are more likely to be married than the 
general public.  The ANES uses several different categories of marital status.  For the 
purpose of testing this hypothesis, all categories other than married have been lumped 
together into an unmarried category.  The results are provided in Table 4.2 below.  More 
than two-thirds of CPS respondents are married, compared to only slightly more than half 
of ANES respondents.   
 
Table 4.2  
Cross-Tabulation for Marital Status 
 
Sample/Subgroup   Married 
Not 
Married Total 
ANES Count 625 586 1211 
  Percent 51.60% 48.40% 100.00% 
CPS  Count 97 42 139 
  Percent 69.80% 30.20% 100.00% 
Animal Rights Count 14 11 25 
  Percent 56.00% 44.00% 100.00% 
Aircraft Over DC Count 26 10 36 
  Percent 72.20% 27.80% 100.00% 
Re-entry Documents Count 28 10 38 
  Percent 73.70% 26.30% 100.00% 
Toxic Chemicals Count 29 11 40 
  Percent 72.50% 27.50% 100.00% 
 
 
A chi-square test presented in Table B.2a in Appendix B indicates the differences 
between observed and expected frequencies for the ANES and CPS samples are 
statistically significant.  There is less than one chance in one thousand that these 
differences are the result of chance.  These results provide strong support for the 
hypothesis that commenters on proposed federal rule changes are more likely to be 
married than the general public.  But, as demonstrated above, it is possible that there are 
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differences among CPS subgroups that might undermine support for the hypothesis on 
marital status.  There appears to be a fairly substantial difference in the marital status of 
the Animal Rights subgroup compared to other CPS subgroups.  The differences in 
subgroups are almost as large as the difference in samples.  However, a chi square test 
shown below in Table B.2b indicates that the differences fail to achieve statistical 
significance.  The reason for the difference in findings is that large samples tend to 
approximate a standard distribution.  Smaller sample sizes are less likely to do so and the 
certainty of the true shape of the distribution is less.  The t-distribution used for smaller 
samples assumes a fatter tail than would be the case in larger samples, meaning that there 
would be fewer cases around a central value and more cases at the extremes of the 
distribution curve.  So, the amount of difference in means required for a finding of 
statistical significance is larger (Babbie, 2004).  So, the consistency of these results 
provides unqualified support for the hypothesis.  Those individuals who make comments 
on proposed federal rules are more likely to be married than the general public. 
The third hypothesis states that commenters on proposed federal rules are better 
educated than the general public.  The ANES collects interval data from zero through 
sixteen years of formal education.  However, all years of education above this are 
grouped into one category.  Therefore, education data is divided into four categories for 
analysis.  Table 4.3 on the following page describes the educational achievements of the 
ANES and CPS subjects in four categories.  The differences in the samples are most 
apparent at the extremes.  ANES respondents are more than three times as likely as CPS 
respondents to have high school education or less.  On the opposite pole, CPS 
respondents are nearly twice as likely as ANES respondents to hold college or advanced 
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degrees.  A chi-square test of statistical significance provided in Table B.3a in Appendix 
B indicates that differences in observed and expected values for the ANES and CPS 
samples are statistically significant.  There is less than one chance in one thousand that 
the differences happened by chance.  These results indicate support for the hypothesis 
that commenters on proposed federal rules have more education than the general public. 
 
Table 4.3 
Cross-tabulation of Education Category 
 
Sample/Subgroup   
High 
School or 
Less 
Some 
College 
College 
Graduate 
or 
Advanced 
Degree Total 
ANES Count 464 352 394 1210 
  Percent 38.30% 29.10% 32.60% 100.00% 
CPS  Count 18 31 90 139 
  Percent 12.90% 22.30% 64.70% 100.00% 
Animal Rights Count 4 10 11 25 
  Percent 16.00% 40.00% 44.00% 100.00% 
Aircraft Over DC Count 3 6 27 36 
  Percent 8.30% 16.70% 75.00% 100.00% 
Re-entry Documents Count 8 6 24 38 
  Percent 21.10% 15.80% 63.20% 100.00% 
Toxic Chemicals Count 3 9 28 40 
  Percent 7.50% 22.50% 70.00% 100.00% 
 
 
Results of cross-tabulation for education categories by CPS subgroup again 
demonstrated relatively high variation.  The Animal Rights subgroup has a substantially 
lower percentage of college graduates and holders of advanced degrees than other 
subgroups.  However, a chi-square test presented in Table B.3d in Appendix B indicates 
that differences in observed and expected frequencies are not statistically significant.  
This finding reinforces support for the hypothesis that participants in the N&C process 
have more years of formal education than the general public.   
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The next hypothesis looks at family income.  It states that CPS respondents have 
higher family incomes than the general public.  Table 4.4 on the following page presents 
a cross-tabulation for family income.  Comparing the two samples, ANES respondents 
are about twice as likely as CPS respondents to occupy the lowest income category.  At 
the opposite pole, CPS respondents are nearly twice as likely as ANES respondents to be 
in the top two income categories.  As indicated in Table B.4a in Appendix B, the 
differences between observed and expected frequencies are statistically significant.  
There is less than one possibility in one thousand that these results are merely a product 
of chance.  The data provide strong support for the hypothesis that participants in the 
N&C process have higher family incomes than the general public. 
 
Table 4.4 
Cross-tabulation of Family Income  
 
  Sample CPS Subgroup 
Family Income   ANES CPS Total Animal 
Rights 
Aircraft 
Over DC 
Re-entry 
Documents 
Toxic 
Chemicals 
0 - $49,999 Count 556 42 598 10 9 11 12 
  Percent 51.9% 31.8% 49.7% 43.5% 25.7% 31.4% 30.8% 
$50,000 - $104,999 Count 359 54 413 9 11 16 18 
  Percent 33.6% 40.9% 34.4% 39.1% 31.4% 45.7% 46.2% 
$105,000 and greater Count 155 36 191 4 15 8 9 
  Percent 14.5% 27.3% 15.9% 17.4% 42.9% 22.9% 23.1% 
Total  Count 1070 132 1202 23 35 35 39 
  Percent 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
The Animal Rights subgroup is about half again as likely as other subgroups to 
fall into the lowest income category. However, it is comparable in the middle category 
where the bulk of CPS respondents tended to congregate.  The results of chi-square tests 
displayed above in Table B.4d in Appendix B indicate that the differences between 
observed and expected counts in the cross-tabulation by CPS subgroup fail to achieve 
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statistical significance.  So, apparent differences between the CPS subgroups are not 
meaningful.  This provides unqualified support for the hypothesis that CPS respondents 
have higher family incomes than the general public. 
 
Table 4.5a 
Cross-tabulation for Six Categories of Race  
 
 
 
Race 
  
ANES 
Sample 
CPS Subgroup  
 
Total 
Animal 
Rights 
Aircraft 
Over DC 
Re-entry 
Documents 
Toxic 
Chemicals 
Black Count 184 0  0 0 0  184 
  Percent 15.3%         13.7% 
Asian Count 33 0  0  0  0  33 
  Percent 2.7%         2.5% 
Native 
American 
Count 19 1 1 1 0  22 
  Percent 1.6% 4.0% 2.9% 2.7%   1.6% 
Hispanic Count 85     1 4 90 
  Percent 7.1%     2.7% 10.3% 6.7% 
White  Count 876 24 34 35 34 1003 
  Percent 72.8% 96.0% 97.1% 94.6% 87.2% 74.9% 
Other Count 7       1 8 
  Percent .6%       2.6% .6% 
Total  Count 1204 25 35 37 39 1340 
  Percent 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
The next hypothesis deals with the subject of race and ethnicity.  Several CPS 
respondents refused to identify their race.  Others identified themselves as "Native 
American" but provided unsolicited comments indicating that they were born in the 
United States and/or the question seemed objectionable.  Even the ANES sample includes 
thirteen subjects with no racial identification and that survey was done face-to-face.  
While the reasons for individuals refusing to provide or providing questionable data on 
race is beyond the scope of this study, the observation of this disinclination among 
participants suggests that the participation of Whites in the N&C process is understated. 
63 
  
 
The sixteen categories of race in the ANES data have been reduced to six 
categories in Table 4.5a above.  The ANES over-sampled Blacks and under-sampled 
Hispanics, based on Census estimates for that period (Bureau of the Census, 2004).  Still, 
it reflects a reasonable level of racial diversity similar to that found in the general public.  
On the other hand, cross-tabulation results for the subcategories of the CPS sample reveal 
a dearth of diversity.  Perhaps the most striking feature of the CPS mix is the total 
absence of Black respondents.   
While this data provide a more complete look at the race of CPS participants, the 
hypothesis to be tested states simply that participants in the N&C process are more likely 
to be White than the general public.  To test this hypothesis, race data is consolidated into 
two categories, White and Non-White.  Results of cross-tabulation are presented below in 
Table 4.5b.  Whites are the majority race in the nation by a substantial, if declining, 
margin.  Likewise, they constitute a substantial majority in both samples.  On the other 
hand, Non-Whites are four times as likely to be included in the ANES sample as in the 
CPS sample.   
 
Table 4.5b 
Cross-tabulation for White and Non-White by Sample 
 
Race   
  
Sample  CPS Subgroups 
ANES CPS Sample 
Total 
Animal 
Rights 
Aircraft 
Over DC 
Re-entry 
Documents 
Toxic 
Chemicals 
Non-White Count 328 9 337 1 1 2 5 
 Percent 27.20% 6.60% 25.10% 4.00% 2.90% 5.40% 12.80% 
White Count 876 127 1003 24 34 35 34 
 Percent 72.80% 93.40% 74.90% 96.00% 97.10% 94.60% 87.20% 
Total  Count 1204 136 1340 25 35 37 39 
 Percent 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
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A chi-square test presented in Table B.5a indicates that the differences between 
observed and expected frequencies for the ANES and CPS samples are statistically 
significant.  There is less than one prospect in one thousand that this distribution occurred 
purely by chance.  This supports Hypothesis 5.  At the sample level, the percentage of 
Whites participating in the notice and comment process is both substantially and 
significantly higher that that in the general public. 
Among the CPS subgroups, although most of the Non-White respondents 
participated in the Toxic Chemical subgroup, the White majority in all issue groups is 
overwhelming.  Chi-square testing presented in Table B.5b in Appendix B indicates that 
the differences in observed and expected counts for the CPS subgroups fail to achieve 
statistical significance, although with the caution that some cells have expected counts of 
less than five.  This evidence serves to buttress the overall finding.  The population of 
notice and comment participants has very little diversity.  But, perhaps, this does not rule 
out the possibility that an agency rule proposal dealing specifically with minority issues 
might attract greater minority participation. 
 
Table 4.6 
Cross-tabulation for Gender 
 
    Sample   CPS Subgroup 
Gender ANES CPS Total Animal 
Rights 
Aircraft 
Over DC 
Re-entry 
Documents 
Toxic 
Chemicals 
CPS 
Subgroup 
Total 
Male Count 566 75 641 1 33 22 19 75 
  Percent 46.70% 54.30% 47.50% 4.00% 94.30% 57.90% 47.50% 54.30% 
Female Count 646 63 709 24 2 16 21 63 
 Percent 53.30% 45.70% 52.50% 96.00% 5.70% 42.10% 52.50% 45.70% 
Total Count 1212 138 1350 25 35 38 40 138 
 Percent 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
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The next hypothesis deals with the gender.  Hypothesis 6 states that N&C 
participants are more likely to be male than the ANES sample.  A cross-tabulation of the 
two samples is provided in Table 4.6 on the previous page.  The percentages are a reverse 
image of each other, with the ANES sample including more women than men and the 
CPS sample including more men than women.  However, the differences are relatively 
small.  A chi-square test of statistical significance presented in Table B.6a in Appendix B 
shows that the differences in observed and expected frequencies for the samples 
approach, but do not achieve, statistical significance.  Therefore, the hypothesis on 
gender is not supported. 
A look at the constituencies of the individual subgroups of the CPS sample 
provides a clue this failure.  Animal rights are almost exclusively a female issue and 
restrictions of private aircraft over Washington, D. C. is almost exclusively a male issue.  
The data strongly suggest that the issue content of the proposed rule change drives gender 
differences in rates of participation for these two issue interests.  The other issues exhibit 
more balanced gender participation.  A chi-square test presented in Table 4.6d below 
indicates that the differences between observed and expected frequencies for CPS 
subgroups are statistically significant.  This supports a modified gender hypothesis.  
Gender may not be the driver of participation, but it strongly influences who is more 
likely to participate in particular kinds of rule proposals. 
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Association Membership 
 
 
Moving away from demographic and socioeconomic determinants, the next two 
hypotheses investigate the power of associations in driving N&C participation.  
Hypothesis 7 states that CPS respondents are more likely to belong to non-religious 
associations than the general public.  A cross-tabulation of organization membership is 
provided in Table 4.7 on the next page.  The differences in rates of civic association 
membership are substantial.  While considerably fewer than half of ANES respondents 
indicated membership in a non-religious organization, more than two-thirds of CPS 
respondents do so.  A chi-square test of statistical significance presented in Table B.7a in 
Appendix B indicates that the difference in observed and expected frequencies for the 
two samples is statistically significant.  The data strongly support the hypothesis that 
N&C participants are more likely than the general public to participate in non-religious 
associations. 
 
Table 4.7 
Cross-tabulation for Organizational Membership 
 
    Sample CPS Subgroup 
  
Organization 
Member 
ANES CPS Total Animal 
Rights 
Aircraft 
Over DC 
Re-entry 
Documents 
Toxic 
Chemicals 
Subgroup 
Total 
Yes Count 445 95 540 13 33 19 30 95 
  Percent 41.80% 67.40% 44.80% 50.00% 91.70% 48.70% 75.00% 67.40% 
No Count 620 46 666 13 3 20 10 46 
  Percent 58.20% 32.60% 55.20% 50.00% 8.30% 51.30% 25.00% 32.60% 
Total  Count 1065 141 1206 26 36 39 40 141 
  Percent 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
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However, a look at the CPS issue groups reveals a more complex relationship 
between organization membership and N&C participation.  The results of cross-
tabulation of organization membership by CPS subgroup demonstrates higher levels of 
association membership for all CPS subgroups than for the ANES sample.  However, 
there is substantial variation among the CPS subgroups.  The Aircraft Over DC subgroup 
is almost twice as likely as the Re-entry Documents subgroup to belong to non-religious 
associations.  The results of chi-square testing presented in Table B.7b in Appendix B 
indicates that the differences between observed and expected counts for the CPS 
subgroups are statistically significant.  This indicates that the role of associations in 
driving N&C participation, while an important factor in all types of proposed rules, is 
more important in some areas than others.  But, since the CPS rates are consistently 
above the ANES rate of membership, these significant differences do not challenge 
support for Hypothesis 7. 
The next hypothesis expands the investigation of the role of associations in the 
N&C comment process.  Hypothesis 8 states that CPS respondents who belong to non-
religious associations belong to more such organizations than do members of the general 
public.  Table 4.8 below presents group statistics for number of organizations.  As 
hypothesized, the mean for number of organizations is higher for the CPS sample than for 
the ANES sample.  N&C participants who belong to non-religious organizations belong 
to half again as many such organizations as the general public.   
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Table 4.8  
Means for Number of Organizations  
 
Group/Subgroup Number Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Standard 
Error 
ANES 445 2.13 1.55 0.007 
CPS 95 3.46 3.89 0.4 
Animal Rights 13 2.54 1.15 0.42 
Aircraft Over DC 33 2.82 1.42 0.25 
Re-entry Documents 19 2.68 1.38 0.32 
Toxic Chemicals 30 5.07 6.39 1.17 
Total 95 3.46 3.89 0.4 
 
 
An independent samples t-test for the number of organizations, displayed in Table 
B.8a in Appendix B, reveals a violation of the homogeneity of variance assumption.  The 
t-statistic when equal variances are not assumed is significant at the .001 level.  These 
test results support the hypothesis that CPS respondents who belong to non-religious 
organizations belong to more of such organizations than ANES respondents.   
Looking next to the CPS subgroups, the mean for the Toxic Chemical subgroup 
appears to be out of line with the others and is nearly twice the mean of the less active 
Animal Rights issue group.  However, an analysis of variance presented in Table B.8b 
indicates that the differences in subgroup means narrowly fail to achieve statistical 
significance.  The relative homogeneity of CPS subgroups reinforces support for 
Hypothesis 8.  Across a range of issue groups, participants in the notice and comment 
process who belong to non-religious organization belong to more of those associations 
than does the general public. 
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Sources of Information 
 
Table 4.9 
Means for Number of Days Watched National News 
 
     Standard 
Deviation 
Standard 
Error Group/Subgroup Number Mean 
ANES 1210 3.58 2.76 0.008 
CPS 140 4.12 2.71 0.23 
Animal Rights 26 4.19 2.74 0.54 
Aircraft Over DC 36 4.00 2.67 0.45 
Re-entry 
Documents 
39 4.95 2.42 0.39 
Toxic Chemicals 39 3.36 2.87 0.46 
 
 
The next set of hypotheses examines the relationship between participation in the 
N&C process and use of various information sources.  It is generally anticipated that 
political participants are better informed than non-participants.  Hypothesis 9 states that 
CPS respondents watch national news on television more frequently than the general 
public.  Respondents to both surveys were asked the number of days in the week that they 
watched national news programs.  Since the data are continuous, group statistics for the 
means are presented in Table 4.9 above.  The mean for the CPS sample is about thirteen 
percent higher than that for the ANES sample.  The results of an independent samples t-
test are presented in Table B.9a in Appendix B reveals that the assumption of equal 
variances is not supported.  However, the t-statistic for equal variances not assumed is 
significant at the .05 level.  This supports Hypothesis 9. 
CPS subgroup means reveal that the Re-entry Documents subgroup watches 
televised national news considerably more frequently than the Toxic Chemical subgroup.  
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However, an analysis of variance presented in Table B.9b indicates that the differences in 
means fail to achieve statistical significance.  The consistency of findings across a range 
of subgroups supports the hypothesis that N&C participants watch national news on 
television more than does the general public. 
Along the same lines, the next hypothesis states that CPS respondents watch local 
news on television more frequently than the general public.  Group statistics displayed on 
the following page in Table 4.10 indicate that there is a difference in means, but the 
direction of difference is exactly the opposite of that hypothesized.  An independent 
samples t-test presented in Table B.10a in Appendix B reveals that the t-statistic for equal 
variances not assumed achieves statistical significance at the .05 level.  Because of the 
direction of the difference, Hypothesis 10 is not supported.  The general public watches 
local news on television more frequently than N&C participants. 
 
Table 4.10 
Group Statistics for Number of Days Watched Local News 
 
  
Sample/Subgroup 
  
Number 
  
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Standard 
Error 
Mean 
ANES 1210 4.47 2.78 0.008 
CPS 139 3.98 2.65 0.22 
Animal Rights 26 4.23 2.45 0.48 
Aircraft Over DC 36 3.56 2.52 0.42 
Re-entry 
Documents 
39 5.03 2.29 0.37 
Toxic Chemicals 38 3.13 2.92 0.47 
 
As is the case with means for watching national news, there is considerably more 
variation in means among CPS subgroups than between ANES and CPS samples.  A one-
way analysis of variance presented in Table B.10b in Appendix B indicates that the 
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differences in issue group means achieves statistical significance.  A multiple comparison 
of means presented in Table B.10c in Appendix B indicates that the difference between 
the Re-entry Subgroup and the Toxic Chemical Subgroup means for watching local news 
on television is significant.  However, neither differs significantly from other CPS 
subgroups.  This indicates that the viewing of local news among N&C participants may 
vary with the issue groups considered.  Since three subgroup means are below the ANES 
mean and one is above, any conclusion about the relationship between viewing televised 
local news and participation in the notice and comment process may be problematic.   
The next hypothesis changes the focus from television to the print media.  In each 
survey, subjects were asked how many days in the past week they read a daily 
newspaper.  Group statistics for this continuous data are summarized in Table 4.11 on the 
following page.  For this variable, the difference in means is substantial and in the 
direction hypothesized.  CPS respondents read daily newspapers twenty-seven percent 
more often than the general public.  Results of significance testing are presented in Table 
B.11a in Appendix B.  The equality of variance assumption is violated, and the t-statistic 
for equal variances not assumed is significant, meaning that the difference in means 
between the samples did not occur by chance.  Along with the magnitude of the 
difference in means, this strongly supports the hypothesis that N&C participants are more 
likely to read a daily newspaper than the general public.   
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Table 4.11 
Group Statistics for Days Read Daily Newspaper 
 
Sample/Subgroup 
 
Number 
 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
ANES 1212 3.08 2.88 .008 
CPS 140 4.23 2.73 .23 
Animal Rights 26 2.54 2.50 .49 
Aircraft Over DC 36 4.19 2.67 .45 
Re-entry Documents 39 4.85 2.67 .43 
Toxic Chemicals 39 4.77 2.62 .42 
 
An examination of subgroup means reveals that the mean for the Animal Rights 
subgroup trails the means of other subgroups by a substantial margin and is lower than 
the ANES mean.  Members of this subgroup are much less likely to read a daily 
newspaper than their peers.  A one-way analysis of variance presented in Table B.11b in 
Appendix B shows that differences in means is statistical significant at the .01 level.  A 
multiple comparison of means presented Table B.11c in Appendix B reveals that, as is 
the case with the age variable, the mean for the Animal Rights subgroup differs 
significantly from the Re-entry Documents and Toxic Chemicals subgroups, while the 
Aircraft Over DC subgroup has no significant difference in means with any subgroup.  
This means that although there is a substantial and significant difference in the number of 
days that N&C participants read daily newspapers as compared to the general public, 
particular issues might attract the participation of interested parties who are less inclined 
to read the newspaper.  The significant differences among the subgroups undermine 
support for Hypothesis 11.  While most of the CPS issue groups are more likely to read 
daily newspapers than the general public, the type of issue for which comment is solicited 
impacts the outcome for this hypothesis. 
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Table 4.12 
Cross-tabulation for Internet Access 
 
Internet 
Access 
 Sample CPS Subgroup 
ANES CPS Total Animal 
Rights 
Aircraft 
Over DC 
Re-entry 
Documents 
Toxic 
Chemicals 
Yes Count 764 136 26 36 35 39 900 
  Percent 71.7% 96.5% 100.0% 100.0% 89.7% 97.5% 74.6% 
No Count 302 5 0  0  4 1 307 
  Percent 28.3% 3.5%     10.3% 2.5% 25.4% 
Total  Count 1066 141 26 36 39 40 1207 
  Percent 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
The final hypothesis to be tested in this section concerning sources of information 
deals with Internet access.  Given the availability of free Internet access at a variety of 
public institutions such as schools, colleges, libraries, service organizations, and various 
government offices, this hypothesis might seem pointless.  However, there is a difference 
between having a facility available at no cost and taking the necessary steps to achieve 
access.  The results of cross-tabulation for Internet access presented above in Table 4.12 
demonstrate that more than a quarter of the general public claims to have no Internet 
access.  This stands in stark contrast to the ninety six percent of CPS respondents who 
report having access.  A chi-square test displayed in Table B.12a in Appendix B indicates 
that differences in expected and observed counts are statistically significant.  There is less 
than one possibility in one thousand that this relationship is the product of chance.  These 
results strongly support the hypothesis that N&C participants are more likely than the 
general public to have access to the Internet. 
Only about four percent of CPS respondents indicate that they do not have 
Internet access.  Even though four out of five of those lacking access are in a single 
subgroup, a chi-square test presented in Table B.12b in Appendix B indicates that the 
difference in observed and expected counts fails to achieve statistical significance, 
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although half of the cells have expected counts of less than five due to the high rates of 
Internet access.  This means that there is consistency across CPS subgroups and 
buttresses the finding that N&C participants are more likely than the general public to 
have Internet access. 
 
Political Activity 
 
Table 4.13 
Cross-tabulation for Contact Government Official   
 
Contact 
Government 
Official 
 Sample CPS Subgroup 
ANES CPS Total Animal 
Rights 
Aircraft 
Over DC 
Re-entry 
Documents 
Toxic 
Chemicals 
Yes Count 222 101 323 12 25 30 34 
  Percent 20.8% 72.7% 26.8% 50.0% 69.4% 76.9% 85.0% 
No Count 844 38 882 12 11 9 6 
  Percent 79.2% 27.3% 73.2% 50.0% 30.6% 23.1% 15.0% 
Total  Count 1066 139 1205 24 36 39 40 
  Percent 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Since making a comment on a proposed federal agency rule is a political activity, 
it is anticipated that CPS respondents have higher levels of other political activities than 
the general public.  Eleven hypotheses are tested in this section.  The first states that CPS 
respondents are more likely than the general public to contact a government official.  
Cross-tabulation results are displayed on the previous page in Table 4.13 and the 
differences are striking.  CPS respondents are about three and a half times as likely to 
contact a government official as ANES respondents.  Given the magnitude of this 
difference, it is unsurprising that a chi-square test displayed in Table B.13A in Appendix 
B indicates that the difference in expected and observed counts is statistically significant.  
These results provide strong support for this hypothesis that participants in the N&C 
process are more likely than the general public to contact a government official. 
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Results for CPS subgroups demonstrate some differences, with the Animal Rights 
subgroup standing at some distance from the other subgroups.  However, even this set of 
respondents contact government officials at more than twice the rate of the general 
public.  A chi-square test presented below in Table B.13b in Appendix B indicates that 
the differences in observed and expected counts between the various subgroups achieve 
statistical significance.  However, since all categories of CPS respondents exhibit higher 
rates of contacting government officials than ANES respondents, differences between 
subgroups should not be interpreted as detracting from the strength of support for 
Hypothesis 13. 
 
Table 4.14 
Cross-tabulation for Attend Public Meeting 
 
 
Attend 
Public 
Meeting 
 Sample  
Total 
CPS Subgroup 
ANES CPS Animal 
Rights 
Aircraft 
Over DC 
Re-entry 
Documents 
Toxic 
Chemicals 
Yes Count 292 59 351 7 13 15 24 
  Percent 27.4% 42.8% 29.2% 29.2% 36.1% 39.5% 60.0% 
No Count 773 79 852 17 23 23 16 
  Percent 72.6% 57.2% 70.8% 70.8% 63.9% 60.5% 40.0% 
Total  Count 1065 138 1203 24 36 38 40 
  Percent 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
The next hypothesis extends this comparison of political participation to attending 
public meetings.  Hypothesis 14 states that CPS respondents are more likely than the 
general public to attend public meetings.  Cross-tabulation results are presented in Table 
4.14 above.  Although CPS respondents are substantially more likely than ANES 
respondents to attend public meetings, the dramatic difference exhibited in contacting 
government officials is diminished.  Still, chi-square testing displayed in Table B.14a in 
Appendix B indicates that the differences between observed and expected frequencies are 
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statistically significant.  This supports the hypothesis that N&C participants are more 
likely than the general public to attend public meetings.   
Cross-tabulation results by CPS subgroup reveal that the rate of attending public 
meetings is more than twice as high for the Toxic Chemical as for the Animal Rights 
subgroup.  However, in this case, the Animal Rights subset is closer to the remainder of 
the sample than the environmentalists.  In spite of this seemingly large difference in rates, 
a chi square test presented in Table B.14b in Appendix B indicates that the differences 
narrowly fail to achieve statistical significance at the .05 level.  The null hypothesis that 
the differences happened by chance cannot be rejected.  This fortifies support for 
Hypothesis 14.  N&C participants are more likely than the general public to attend public 
meetings.   
 
Table 4.15 
Cross-tabulation for Discuss Politics 
 
  Sample CPS Subgroup 
Discuss 
Politics 
 ANES CPS Total Animal 
Rights 
Aircraft 
Over DC 
Re-entry 
Documents 
Toxic 
Chemicals 
Yes Count 292 131 423 20 35 37 39 
  Percent 27.4% 94.2% 35.1% 83.3% 97.2% 94.9% 97.5% 
No Count 773 8 781 4 1 2 1 
  Percent 72.6% 5.8% 64.9% 16.7% 2.8% 5.1% 2.5% 
Total  Count 1065 139 1204 24 36 39 40 
  Percent 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Hypothesis 15 states that CPS respondents are more likely than the general public 
to discuss politics with family and friends.  Cross-tabulation data presented in Table 4.15 
above indicates that CPS respondents are much more likely than ANES respondents to 
engage in this relatively low-cost political activity.  Only slightly more than a quarter of 
ANES respondents claim to discuss politics.  This plainly contrasts with the nine out of 
ten CPS respondents who say they discuss politics with family or friends.  Chi-square 
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testing displayed in Table B.15a indicates that the differences in observed and expected 
values are statistically significant.  This strongly supports the hypothesis.  N&C 
respondents are much more likely than the general public to discuss politics with family 
and friends.   
Cross-tabulation results for this variable by CPS subgroup clearly demonstrate 
that this tendency to discuss politics remains strong throughout all categories of N&C 
participants tested.  Even among Animal Rights respondents, who seem to trail the pack 
in many regards, political conversation is reported by more than eight out of ten.  Chi-
square testing exhibited in Table B.15b on the previous page confirms that the relatively 
small differences in the observed and expected counts among the different issue groups 
fail to achieve statistical significance.  This consistency among subgroups serves to 
reinforce support for the hypothesis that N&C participants are more likely than the 
general public to discuss politics with family and friends. 
 
Table 4.16 
Cross-tabulation for Listen to Talk Radio 
 
Listen to 
Talk Radio 
 Sample CPS Subgroup 
ANES CPS Total Animal 
Rights 
Aircraft 
Over DC 
Re-entry 
Documents 
Toxic 
Chemicals 
Yes Count 471 100 571 16 29 26 29 
  Percent 44.2% 73.0% 47.5% 66.7% 80.6% 70.3% 72.5% 
No Count 595 37 632 8 7 11 11 
  Percent 55.8% 27.0% 52.5% 33.3% 19.4% 29.7% 27.5% 
Total  Count 1066 137 1203 24 36 37 40 
  Percent 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
The next hypothesis probes the juncture of politics and entertainment.  Hypothesis 
16 states that CPS respondents are more likely to listen to political talk radio than the 
general public.  Table 4.16 above displays the results of cross-tabulation.  The difference 
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between the ANES and CPS samples is not as pronounced as it is with the previous 
participation indicator, perhaps because of the respondents' taste in entertainment or lack 
thereof.  Still, a substantially larger percentage of CPS respondents say they listen to 
political talk radio than do ANES respondents.  Results of chi-square testing presented on 
in Table B.16a in Appendix B show that differences in observed and expected counts 
achieve statistical significance.  There is less than one possibility in one thousand that the 
differences happened by chance.  This supports the hypothesis that N&C participants are 
more likely than the general public to listen to talk radio. 
Cross-tabulation results by CPS subgroup indicate that the rate of listening to 
political talk radio is relatively consistent across N&C participants.  As might be 
expected, the less politically active Animal Rights issue group is the least likely to listen 
to political talk radio.  The Aircraft Over DC subgroup is the most likely.  However, 
these differences in observed and expected counts fail to achieve statistical significance.  
So, it may be concluded that there is neither a substantial nor significant difference in the 
rates of listening between the issue groups.  This underpins the finding that N&C 
participants are more likely than the general public to listen to political talk radio. 
So far, the hypotheses have dealt with fairly passive activities.  Even discussing 
politics with family and friends requires no more than an exchange of comments in a 
supportive setting.  The next hypothesis ventures into a more active role in the political 
life of one's community.  No matter how homogeneous our political community might be, 
there are going to be differences in issue positions or personal attributes among the 
candidates for public office.  Hypothesis 17 states that CPS respondents are more likely 
79 
  
 
than the general public to try to influence other voters to vote for a particular candidate 
for public office. 
 
Table 4.17 
Cross-tabulation for Try to Influence Voters  
 
Try to 
Influence 
Voters 
 Sample CPS Subgroup 
ANES CPS Total Animal 
Rights 
Aircraft 
Over DC 
Re-entry 
Documents 
Toxic 
Chemicals 
Yes Count 517 89 606 13 23 22 31 
  Percent 48.5% 64.0% 50.3% 54.2% 63.9% 56.4% 77.5% 
No Count 549 50 599 11 13 17 9 
  Percent 51.5% 36.0% 49.7% 45.8% 36.1% 43.6% 22.5% 
Total  Count 1066 139 1205 24 36 39 40 
  Percent 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
The results for cross-tabulation by sample are presented in Table 4.17 on the 
previous page.  While the differences in rates for trying to influence other voters are not 
as great as for some participation variables presented earlier, there is still a fifteen-point 
spread between the CPS and ANES samples.  Chi-square results displayed in Table B.17a 
in Appendix B, the differences in observed and expected counts are statistically 
significant at the .001 level.  So, the differential in rates of this behavior is both 
substantial and significant.  Results support Hypothesis 17.  N&C participants are more 
likely to try to influence other voters than are members of the general public. 
Cross-tabulation analysis of data by CPS subgroup indicates a twenty three-point 
spread between the issue groups with Animal Rights at the bottom and Toxic Chemicals 
at the top.  This relationship is similar to that witnessed in Hypothesis 15.  Similarly, chi-
square testing presented in Table B.17b in Appendix B indicates that the differences in 
observed and expected values are not statistically significant.  The differences could have 
happened by chance.  This demonstrates consistency of support for Hypothesis 17.  
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Notice and comment participants are more likely than the general public to try to 
influence the votes of others.   
 
Table 4.18 
Cross-tabulation for Attend Campaign Meeting  
 
Attend 
Campaign 
Meeting 
 Sample CPS Subgroup 
ANES CPS Total Animal 
Rights 
Aircraft 
Over DC 
Re-entry 
Documents 
Toxic 
Chemicals 
Yes Count 81 28 109 2 2 7 17 
  Percent 7.6% 20.1% 9.0% 8.3% 5.6% 17.9% 42.5% 
No Count 985 111 1096 22 34 32 23 
  Percent 92.4% 79.9% 91.0% 91.7% 94.4% 82.1% 57.5% 
Total  Count 1066 139 1205 24 36 39 40 
  Percent 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
The next hypothesis looks at a political activity that is even more costly in terms 
of time and effort.  It states that CPS respondents are more likely than the general public 
to attend political campaign events such as meetings, rallies, and speeches.  This type of 
behavior has become rare in modern America as indicated in cross-tabulation results 
displayed above in Table 4.18a.  Fewer than one in ten ANES respondents claims to 
attend campaign meetings.  Although the rate of attending political events is relatively 
low among CPS respondents, it is more than double that of the ANES respondents.  Chi-
square testing exhibited in Table B.18a in Appendix B shows that the differences in 
observed and expected counts are statistically significant.  These results support the 
hypothesis that N&C participants are more likely than the general public to participate in 
campaign events. 
However, a closer look at the data by CPS subgroup casts some doubt on the 
relevance of this finding.  More than sixty percent of the CPS respondents claiming to 
attend campaign events are in one issue group.  This may be testimony to the strength of 
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the environmental movement in mobilizing its constituency.  Members of the Toxic 
Chemical subgroup are more than seven times as likely as members of the Aircraft Over 
DC issue group to exhibit this behavior.  Chi-square testing presented in Table B.18b 
indicates that the differences in observed and expected counts for these subgroups are 
statistically significant.  There is less than one chance in a thousand that the substantial 
differences in the subgroups are a product of random chance.  Since one issue group is 
below the ANES rate and three are above it, support for Hypothesis 18 is weakened.  
However, based on the preliminary research for this project, far more than half of the 
total comments by individuals during the study period were made on proposed 
environmental rules.  So, while environmentalists may be statistically different from 
other issue groups in this sample, their preponderance in the aggregate of N&C 
participants makes this behavior appear more typical than unusual for the average 
individual making a comment on a proposed rule. 
 
Table 4.19 
Cross-tabulation for Display Campaign Sign 
 
 
Display 
Campaign 
Sign 
 Sample CPS Subgroup 
ANES CPS  
Total 
Animal 
Rights 
Aircraft 
Over DC 
Re-entry 
Documents 
Toxic 
Chemicals 
Yes Count 220 49 269 7 11 9 22 
  Percent 20.6% 35.3% 22.3% 29.2% 30.6% 23.1% 55.0% 
No Count 846 90 936 17 25 30 18 
  Percent 79.4% 64.7% 77.7% 70.8% 69.4% 76.9% 45.0% 
 Total Count 1066 139 1205 24 36 39 40 
  Percent 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
The next hypothesis examines the extent to which an individual might identify 
with a party, candidate, or issue.  While a person might anonymously attend a campaign 
event, some people go out of their way to let others know where they stand on current 
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political questions.  Hypothesis 19 states that CPS respondents are more likely than the 
general public to display campaign signs, buttons, or stickers.  The results of the cross-
tabulation are exhibited in Table 4.19 on the previous page.  When compared to the data 
for the previous hypothesis, Putnam's lament for Americans coming together rings clear.  
ANES respondents are nearly three times as likely to display a campaign sign as they are 
to attend a political campaign meeting.  It would appear that respondents find political 
identification considerably less daunting than political association with their fellow 
citizens.   
The differences in rates of political identification between the samples are 
substantial, with CPS respondents about forty two percent more likely than ANES 
respondents to report this behavior.  Chi-square testing displayed in Table B.19a confirms 
that the differences in observed and expected counts are statistically significant.  This 
supports the hypothesis.  N&C participants are more likely than the general public to 
display a campaign sign, button, or sticker.   
However, differences by subgroup might appear to undermine this support.  When 
CPS respondents are broken down by subgroup, dominance by the environmentalists 
similar to that found in Hypothesis 18 is revealed.  The environmentalists are 
considerably more likely than other issue groups to participate in this type of political 
activity.  The Toxic Chemical subgroup exhibits more than double the rate of political 
identification of the Re-entry Documents subgroup.  Results of chi-square testing 
exhibited in Table B.19b in Appendix B show that the differences in observed and 
expected counts are statistically significant at the .05 level.  It must be noted that 
although the differences are significant, all CPS subgroups exhibit this behavior at higher 
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levels than the ANES sample.  Therefore, the finding that N&C participants are more 
likely than the public to display campaign signs is not diminished. 
The next three hypotheses look at checkbook issues.  One may give her heart to 
any number of issues, but she is likely to be more focused on those issues on which she 
expends her limited financial resources.  Hypothesis 20 states that CPS respondents are 
more likely than the public to contribute to a candidate for political office.  Cross-
tabulation data are presented on the following page in Table 4.20.  While giving money 
to political candidates is relatively uncommon on the whole, CPS respondents are more 
than three times as likely to do so than ANES respondents.  The results of chi-square 
testing displayed in Table B.20a in Appendix B indicate that the differences in observed 
and expected counts are statistically significant.  This supports the hypothesis.  N&C 
participants are more likely than the general public to make contributions to candidates.   
 
Table 4.20 
Cross-tabulation for Contribute to Candidate 
 
Contribute to 
Candidate 
 Sample CPS Subgroup 
ANES CPS Total Animal 
Rights 
Aircraft 
Over DC 
Re-entry 
Documents 
Toxic 
Chemicals 
Yes Count 102 46 148 5 8 10 23 
  Percent 9.6% 33.1% 12.3% 20.8% 22.2% 25.6% 57.5% 
No Count 964 93 1057 19 28 29 17 
  Percent 90.4% 66.9% 87.7% 79.2% 77.8% 74.4% 42.5% 
Total  Count 1066 139 1205 24 36 39 40 
  Percent 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
A look at cross-tabulation results by CPS category reveals the familiar pattern of 
unusually high rates of participation by the Toxic Chemical subgroup.  More than half of 
Toxic Chemical respondents report contributions to candidates.  The environmentalists 
are more than twice as likely as other issue groups in the CPS sample to contribute to a 
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political candidate.  Chi-square testing presented in Table B.20b in Appendix B confirms 
that the differences in observed and expected counts by CPS subgroup are statistically 
significant.  This might tend to undermine support for Hypothesis 20.  However, it must 
be noted that the Animal Rights subgroup, which exhibits the lowest likelihood of 
participation in this particular behavior, participates at more than twice the rate of the 
ANES sample.  Thus, the significant differences in the subgroups do not dilute the 
substantial and significant difference between the ANES sample and any CPS issue 
group. 
 
Table 4.21 
Cross-tabulation for Contributions to Party 
 
Contribute 
to Party 
 Sample CPS Subgroup 
ANES CPS Total Animal 
Rights 
Aircraft 
Over DC 
Re-entry 
Documents 
Toxic 
Chemicals 
Yes Count 101 38 139 3 8 6 21 
  Percent 9.5% 27.3% 11.6% 12.5% 22.2% 15.4% 52.5% 
No Count 963 101 1064 21 28 33 19 
  Percent 90.5% 72.7% 88.4% 87.5% 77.8% 84.6% 47.5% 
Total  Count 1064 139 1203 24 36 39 40 
  Percent 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
More than three decades ago, Broder (1972) sounded the warning that political 
parties are in decline and political campaigns are becoming candidate centered.  While 
political parties have certainly lost many of their historic roles, their importance in 
fundraising remains impressive.  Data presented above in Table 4.21 suggest that rates of 
contributions to candidates and political parties are remarkably similar for the ANES 
sample.  Although contribution rates to political parties dropped by six points for the CPS 
sample, they remained almost three times that of the ANES sample.  Chi-square testing 
exhibited in Table B.21a in Appendix B confirms that the differences in observed and 
expected frequencies between the samples are statistically significant.  This substantial 
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and significant differential supports the hypothesis that N&C participants are more likely 
than the general public to contribute to political parties. 
Cross-tabulation data for CPS subgroups reveals that the rate of contribution 
remains the same for the Aircraft Over DC subgroup and declines for other issue groups 
as compared to contributions to political candidates.  Even with this decline, the Toxic 
Chemical respondents are two to four times as likely as the respondents of other CPS 
issue groups to report contributions to political parties.  As indicated in Table B.21b in 
Appendix B, the differences in observed and expected counts between subgroups are 
statistically significant.  Such a lack of consistency might tend to deteriorate confidence 
in support for this hypothesis.  However, even the lowest performing CPS issue group 
exhibited a twenty four percent higher rate of participation than the ANES sample.  This 
differential, combined with the substantial difference in the aggregate rate of 
contributions to political parties and the sheer volume of environmentalist participation in 
the N&C process, may serve to lessen concern for the viability of support for Hypothesis 
21. 
 
Table 4.22 
Cross-tabulation for Contribute to Other Group 
 
Contribute to 
Other Group 
 Sample CPS Subgroup 
ANES CPS Total Animal 
Rights 
Aircraft 
Over DC 
Re-entry 
Documents 
Toxic 
Chemicals 
Yes Count 67 49 116 2 15 7 25 
  Percent 6.3% 35.5% 9.6% 8.3% 41.7% 17.9% 64.1% 
No Count 998 89 1087 22 21 32 14 
  Percent 93.7% 64.5% 90.4% 91.7% 58.3% 82.1% 35.9% 
Total  Count 1065 138 1203 24 36 39 39 
  Percent 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Results for the last two hypotheses demonstrate a low rate of contribution by the 
ANES sample either to candidates for public office or political parties.  The next 
hypothesis extends this investigation into to the world of interest group politics.  
Hypothesis 22 states that CPS respondents are more likely than the general public to 
contribute to a group other than a political party that supports or opposes a candidate for 
public office.  Not surprisingly, cross-tabulation results presented above in Table 4.22 
show a decline of about half in the rate of contributions for ANES respondents as 
compared to their contribution rates to individual candidates and political parties.  Only 
about one in sixteen ANES respondents reports giving money to an association 
supporting or opposing political candidates.  For the CPS sample, this rate exceeds one in 
three.  Chi-square test results presented in Table B.22a indicate that the differences in 
observed and expected frequencies for this variable are statistically significant.  This 
supports the hypothesis that N&C participants are more likely than the general public to 
give money to organizations that support or oppose political candidates. 
Again, substantial differences are apparent among the CPS issue groups.  The 
Toxic Chemical issue group continues to rank highest in participation.  However, the 
Aircraft over DC subgroup emerges at a substantially higher level than it has in previous 
variables dealing with contributions.  These two subgroups rank highest in group-
membership (see Table 4.7) and in number of non-religious associations (see Table 4.8).  
This points to the role of interest groups in fundraising for political purposes.  As 
indicated in chi-square results presented above in Table B.22b in Appendix B, the 
differences in observed and expected counts are statistically significant.  Support for 
Hypothesis 22 is conditional and may vary as issue groups enter and exit the mix of N&C 
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participants during a particular study period.  However, this variation in rates of 
participation tends to operate at substantially higher levels for all CPS subgroups than 
those exhibited by the general public.  Therefore, Hypothesis 22 is confirmed, 
conditionally. 
The next hypothesis looks at voting.  More than eight out of ten ANES 
respondents report voting in the 2004 election.  Unfortunately, the Bureau of the Census 
reports that only about sixty four percent of the voting age population actually voted.  
The difference might be the result of an unrepresentative ANES sample.  However, given 
the care and expertise typical of this highly respected national polling organization, a 
more likely explanation is self-presentational influences.  Over-reporting of positive 
behaviors and under-reporting of negative behaviors are routine features in the 
environment of survey research.  As noted previously, in the CPS survey, voting refers to 
the 2006 midterm elections while the ANES survey question refers to the 2004 
presidential election.  Although the Census Bureau has not yet completed its report on the 
2006 election as of this writing, it is fair to assert that midterm elections have 
substantially lower turnout rates than presidential elections.   
 
Table 4.23 
Cross-tabulation for Vote 
 
 
Vote 
 Sample CPS Subgroup 
ANES CPS Total Animal 
Rights 
Aircraft 
Over DC 
Re-entry 
Documents 
Toxic 
Chemicals 
Yes Count 441 132 573 20 36 37 39 
  Percent 82.1% 95.0% 84.8% 83.3% 100.0% 94.9% 97.5% 
No Count 96 7 103 4   2 1 
  Percent 17.9% 5.0% 15.2% 16.7%   5.1% 2.5% 
 Total Count 537 139 676 24 36 39 40 
  Percent 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Cross-tabulations results presented above in Table 4.23 indicate that, even with 
this handicap, CPS respondents report outvoting ANES respondents by thirteen 
percentage points.  Chi-square testing presented above in Table B.23a in Appendix B 
indicates that the differences in observed and expected counts are statistically significant.  
The data support the hypothesis that N&C participants are more likely to vote than the 
general public. 
While there is some variation among CPS issue groups, voting rates are so high 
that there are only seven subjects who indicated that they did not vote.  Four of these are 
in the Animal Rights subgroup.  All of the respondents in the Aircraft Over DC issue 
group claimed to have voted.  As indicated in Table B.23b in Appendix B, the differences 
may be statistically significant at the .05 level, but with half of the cells generating 
expected values of less than five, the test is not reliable.  So, since all subgroups report 
higher levels of voting than the ANES sample, it is doubtful that any inter-group 
differences can clearly be said to undermine this hypothesis. 
 
Efficacy and Trust 
 
Table 4.24 
Group Statistics for People Like Me Don't Have Any Say  
 
 
Sample/Subgroup 
 
Number 
 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Standard 
Error Mean 
ANES 1065 3.04 1.25 .004 
CPS 139 3.59 1.12 .01 
Animal Rights 26 4.12 .86 .17 
Aircraft Over DC 36 3.53 1.16 .19 
Re-entry Documents 39 3.36 1.20 .19 
Toxic Chemicals 38 3.54 1.09 .18 
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The final set of hypotheses examines the relationship of efficacy and trust to 
participation in the N&C process.  Hypothesis 24 states that CPS respondents are less 
likely than the general public to agree with the statement that people like themselves do 
not have much say in what government does.  This variable tests efficacy.  Measurement 
for this variable is a five-point scale in which a score of one means strong agreement (low 
efficacy) and a score of five means strong disagreement (high efficacy).  Group statistics 
displayed above in Table 4.24 demonstrate that ANES respondents are about fifteen 
percent more likely than CPS respondents to agree with a statement indicating that they 
have no say in government.  This indicates a higher level of efficacy among CPS 
respondents.  The results of independent samples testing for this hypothesis presented in 
Table B.24b in Appendix B reveal a violation of the homogeneity of variance 
assumption.  The t-statistic for equal variances not assumed is significant.  There is less 
than one possibility in one thousand that the differences in means happened by pure 
chance.  This supports Hypothesis 24.  CPS respondents demonstrate higher levels of 
efficacy than the ANES sample.  
The data for CPS subgroups reveal substantial differences in means among the 
issue groups.  Unexpectedly, Animal Rights respondents, who rank at or near the bottom 
of CPS subgroups in measures of political participation, display the highest levels of 
efficacy.  Re-entry Documents respondents who seem to be without any meaningful form 
of interest group association report the lowest level.  Given their responses to other 
questions, it might be expected that the Animal Rights subgroup would perform closer to 
the ANES mean.  Perhaps their optimism is merely a result of their relatively low levels 
of experience working in the pressure group arena.  One-way analysis of variance data 
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are presented in Table B.24b in Appendix B.  For this set of issue groups, the differences 
narrowly fail to achieve statistical significance.  Given the substantial difference between 
the lowest CPS subgroup and the ANES mean, the data confirm Hypothesis 24.  Notice 
and comment participants exhibit higher levels of efficacy than the general public. 
The next hypothesis takes a look at the role of elections in making government 
accountable to the people.  Respondents were asked to agree or disagree with the 
statement that elections make government pay attention to what the people think.  Again, 
a low score indicates agreement (trust government) and a high score indicates 
disagreement (distrust government).  Hypothesis 25 states that CPS respondents are less 
likely than ANES respondents to agree with this statement.  Group statistics for this 
hypothesis are presented in Table 4.25 on the next page.  As with the previous 
hypothesis, the difference in means is substantial, this time about twenty five percent 
higher for the CPS respondents.  Results of an independent samples t-test presented in 
Table B.25a indicate that the t-statistic for equal variances not assumed is statistically 
significant.  This supports Hypothesis 25.  CPS respondents are more likely to disagree 
that elections make government pay attention to the people.   
 
Table 4.25 
Group Statistics for Elections Make Government Pay Attention 
 
 
Sample/Subgroup 
 
Number 
 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Standard 
Error Mean 
ANES 1063 2.03 1.27 .004 
CPS 141 2.73 1.09 .009 
Animal Rights 26 2.77 1.11 .22 
Aircraft Over DC 36 2.61 .96 .16 
Re-entry Documents 39 2.87 1.15 .18 
Toxic Chemicals 40 2.68 1.16 .18 
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Descriptive statistics for the CPS issue groups indicate that the Re-entry 
Documents issue group is the most negative about the ability of elections to make 
government pay attention to the people, while the Aircraft Over DC subgroup is the most 
positive.  However, the range of means is much smaller than that presented for the 
previous variable.  Interestingly, the Animal Rights subgroup, which exhibited such high 
levels of confidence in their own ability to make their voices heard by government, is not 
nearly so convinced that they could do so through the electoral process.  The results of a 
one-way analysis of variance presented in Table B.25b in Appendix B reveal that the 
differences in means fail to achieve statistical significance.  The proximity of subgroup 
means tends to reinforce support for Hypothesis 25.  From these findings, it may be 
concluded that N&C participants trust the electoral system, and thereby, the system of 
representative democracy, less than does the general public. 
The final hypothesis extends the investigation of assessments of the influence of 
interest groups in formulating government policy.  Hypothesis 26 states that CPS 
respondents are more likely than ANES respondents to agree with the statement that 
government is run by a few big interests.  In this case, a low score is evidence of belief in 
a strong influence of interest groups and a high score indicates belief in a lesser role.  
Group statistics are displayed below in Table 4.26.  CPS respondents are about fourteen 
percent more likely than ANES respondents to agree with the statement.  Results of an 
independent samples t-test presented in Table B.26a indicate that the t-statistic for equal 
variances not assumed is statistically significant at the .001 level.  The means for the two 
samples are both substantially and significantly different, supporting Hypothesis 26.  CPS 
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respondents are more likely than ANES respondents to agree that government is run by a 
few big interests.   
 
Table 4.26 
Group Statistics for Government Run by a Few Big Interests 
 
 
Sample/Subgroup 
 
Number 
 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Standard 
Error 
Mean 
ANES 1025 2.65 1.97 .006 
CPS 141 2.27 1.09 .009 
Animal Rights 26 2.31 1.05 .21 
Aircraft Over DC 36 2.86 1.15 .19 
Re-entry Documents 39 2.23 1.01 .16 
Toxic Chemicals 40 1.76 .89 .14 
 
However, the means of the various issue groups demonstrate that there is a lack of 
uniformity of opinion in the CPS sample.  This time, it is the environmentalists, probably 
the strongest non-business issue group in Washington, that scores the strongest agreement 
with the statement.  The Aircraft Over DC issue group, the next best organized of the 
subgroups, shows the strongest disagreement, with a mean nearly forty percent higher 
than the Toxic Chemical subgroup.  So, apparently, the level of associational influence is 
not the only driver of this variable.  Results of a one-way analysis of variance are 
presented in Table B.26b in Appendix B.  As might be expected, the substantial 
difference between the extremes is sufficient to achieve statistical significance.   
The results of multiple comparisons of means by CPS subgroup are displayed in 
Table B.26c in Appendix B.  A pattern of significant polar differences is apparent and the 
difference in polar means is statistically significant.  However, the means of the middle 
groups are not significantly different from each other or from either pole.  The Toxic 
Chemical subgroup mean drags down the CPS average.  Given the high level of 
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participation by environmental groups in the notice and comment process and the 
substantial differences between the environmentalists and other issue groups, it is likely 
that such divisions are typical of most samples of participants.  Since this sample has one 
issue group exhibiting a mean above the ANES mean and three below the ANES mean, 
support for Hypothesis 26 is compromised.  What can be stated with reasonable 
confidence is that environmentalist, probably the single largest segment of N&C 
participants, are more likely than the general public to mistrust the influence of big 
interest groups on government policy, in spite of the fact that they are themselves the 
dutiful soldiers of a big and powerful interest group. 
Table 4.27 on the following page summarizes findings for the twenty-six 
hypotheses tested.  For the entire sample, all hypotheses are supported at the sample level 
except for gender and watching local television news.  However, subgroup results are not 
as consistent.  For hypotheses concerning age, reading the newspaper, attending political 
campaign meetings, and opinions of special interest group control of the government, the 
range of subgroup scores includes the ANES score.  This demonstrates that, in some 
aspects, N&C participants are not homogeneous.  The issue involved in the proposed rule 
does affect characteristics of participants, but not in most cases. 
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Table 4.27  
Summary of Findings 
 
Hypothesis 
Number Variable Expectation 
Supported 
for Sample 
Supported for 
Subgroups 
1 Age Older Yes No 
2 Marital Status Married Yes Yes 
3 Education Higher Yes Yes 
4 Household Income Higher Yes Yes 
5 Race White Yes Yes 
6 Gender Male No No 
7 Association Membership Member Yes Yes* 
8 Number of Associations More Yes Yes 
9 Watch National News More Yes Yes 
10 Watch Local News More No No 
11 Read Newspaper More Yes No 
12 Internet Access More Yes Yes 
13 Contact Government Official More Yes Yes* 
14 Attend Public Meeting More Yes Yes 
15 Discuss Politics More Yes Yes 
16 Political Talk Radio More Yes Yes 
17 Influence Others More Yes Yes 
18 Attend Campaign Meetings More Yes No 
19 Campaign Signs More Yes Yes* 
20 Contribute to Candidate More Yes Yes* 
21 Contribute to Party More Yes Yes* 
22 Contribute to Other Political Group More Yes Yes* 
23 Vote More Yes Yes* 
24 People Like Me Don't Have Say Disagree Yes Yes 
25 Elections Make Government Pay Attention Disagree Yes Yes 
26 Government Controlled by Special Interests Agree Yes No 
* Differences in subgroups are significant.  However, subgroup scores exceed the ANES 
score.   
 
In addition to gathering data for hypothesis testing, several survey questions 
explore aspects of participation for which there are presently no theories.  This data is 
presented in the following chapter to provide an enhanced picture of both the N&C 
participant and the process of participation. 
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Chapter 5 
Supplemental Information On Citizen Participation Study Subjects 
 
The foregoing completes the portion of this study addressing the testing 
hypothesis.  Several other questions are included in the CPS survey concerning the 
experiences and attitudes of participants in the N&C process.  Since these variables are 
not available for the ANES sample, no hypotheses are offered.  However, these variables 
do provide important insights into administrative issues and several variables supplement 
findings for various hypotheses. 
 
Table 5.1 
Cross-tabulation for Get Information From Government 
 
 
Get Information From 
Government 
 CPS Subgroup  
 
Total 
Animal 
Rights 
Aircraft 
Over DC 
Re-entry 
Documents 
Toxic 
Chemicals 
Yes Count 11 24 28 10 73 
  Percent 44.0% 70.6% 80.0% 32.3% 58.4% 
No Count 14 10 7 21 52 
  Percent 56.0% 29.4% 20.0% 67.7% 41.6% 
Total  Count 25 34 35 31 125 
  Percent 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Table 5.1a above provides a summary of the experiences of participants in the 
rule-making process in securing information from government sources.  Overall, N&C 
participants appear to be able to get sufficient information from government sources.  The 
relatively low percentage getting government information in the Animal Rights may be 
due to either the relative inexperience of the participants or the simple fact that the 
Department of Agriculture does not keep specific data on things that it does not regulate 
specifically.  Substantial majorities of participants in both the Aircraft Over DC and the 
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Re-entry Documents issue groups seemed to find sufficient information from government 
sources.  The one group that demonstrates a serious lack of confidence in government 
sources is the Toxic Chemical subgroup.  This issue group is both the best educated and 
most experienced politically.  However, previous confrontational and adversarial 
relations with the EPA and business concerns may foster a climate of distrust among 
individual issue group members.  Results of a chi-square test presented in Table C.1 in 
Appendix C indicate that the differences between the subgroups in observed and expected 
frequencies are statistically significant.  This means that the sufficiency of government 
information varies among the various issue groups.  So, no general statement can be 
made concerning the availability of government information on issues concerning 
proposed agency rules.  It appears that the subject matter of the proposed rule and the 
nature of the issue group may affect perceptions of information adequacy.   
Table 5.2 
Cross-tabulation for Organization Ask You to Make Comment  
 
 
Ask to Make 
Comment 
 CPS Subgroup  
 
Total 
Animal 
Rights 
Aircraft 
Over DC 
Re-entry 
Documents 
Toxic 
Chemicals 
Yes Count 17 30 3 30 80 
  Percent 65.4% 83.3% 8.3% 76.9% 58.4% 
No Count 9 6 33 9 57 
  Percent 34.6% 16.7% 91.7% 23.1% 41.6% 
Total  Count 26 36 36 39 137 
  Percent 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
The next question addresses the role of associations in promoting participation in 
the N&C process.  Table 5.2 below displays the outcome of cross-tabulation analysis for 
this question.  The Re-entry Documents subgroup has a substantially lower rate of 
interest group contact than other subgroups.  This may be the result of relatively low rates 
of organizational membership displayed in Hypothesis 7, or it may simply be a reflection 
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of the lack of a driving interest group in this issue area.  Compared to other issue groups, 
Re-entry Documents respondents score midrange in age, education, and income, and only 
slightly higher in rates of marriage.  They score low to midrange in all measures of 
political activity.  But, Re-entry Documents respondents score the lowest of the CPS 
subgroups in associational membership.  Other than their interest in their own personal 
travel plans, no connecting force is identified.  A chi-square test presented in Table C.2 in 
Appendix C above shows that the differences in observed and expected counts is 
statistically significant.  So, no general statement can be made about the role of interest 
groups in soliciting participation in the N&C process.  However, the rates of solicitation 
in three of four of the issue categories points to an important role for interest groups in 
particular issue areas.   
 
Table 5.3 
Cross-tabulation for Contact Elected Official About Issue  
 
 
Contact Elected 
Official About Issue 
 CPS Subgroup  
 
Total 
Animal 
Rights 
Aircraft 
Over DC 
Re-entry 
Documents 
Toxic 
Chemicals 
Yes Count 11 21 26 23 81 
  Percent 42.3% 58.3% 66.7% 63.9% 59.1% 
No Count 15 15 13 13 56 
  Percent 57.7% 41.7% 33.3% 36.1% 40.9% 
Total  Count 26 36 39 36 137 
  Percent 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
A central claim of the Refounding Movement is that direct citizen participation 
empowers groups that presently have no political voice.  Cross-tabulation data presented 
above in Table 5.3 offers a strong evidence of exactly the opposite outcome.  Even 
though the proposed rule is an administrative decision rather than a decision by elected 
officials, a substantial majority of CPS respondents indicate that they have contacted an 
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elected official concerning this issue.  Interestingly, the issue group with the lowest levels 
of political sophistication exhibits the lowest level of contacting elected officials as might 
be expected, but the Re-entry Documents subgroup, the issue group with the lowest level 
of interest group motivation, has the highest level of contacting.  A chi-square test 
displayed in Table C.3 in Appendix C indicates that differences in observed and expected 
counts fail to achieve statistical significance.  Therefore, it may be concluded that N&C 
participants across a wide range of areas of concern contact elected officials concerning 
issues raised in agency rulemaking.  So, even without a notice and comment process, it 
appears that these citizen participants have political voice and they know how to use it.  
 
Table 5.4 
Cross-tabulation for Made Previous Comments  
 
Made 
Previous 
Comments 
 CPS Subgroup  
 
Total 
Animal 
Rights 
Aircraft 
Over DC 
Re-entry 
Documents 
Toxic 
Chemicals 
Yes Count 14 24 25 37 100 
  Percent 53.8% 66.7% 67.6% 92.5% 71.9% 
No Count 12 12 12 3 39 
  Percent 46.2% 33.3% 32.4% 7.5% 28.1% 
Total  Count 26 36 37 40 139 
  Percent 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Not only do CPS respondents contact elected officials at high rates, they also 
make multiple comments.  Cross-tabulation results presented above in Table 5.4 indicate 
that a substantial majority of N&C participants have made previous comments.  More 
than nine out of ten Toxic Chemical respondents report previous comments and a 
majority of the much less politically active Animal Rights respondents report the same.  
While the chi-square test results displayed in Table C.4 in Appendix C indicate that the 
differences in observed and expected frequencies are statistically significant, those 
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differences are merely in the size of the majority.  Consistently, most participants in the 
notice and comment process are repeat participants.  Since the total number of 
participants for all proposed rules is very small in comparison to the population of 
potential participants, this level of repetitive participatory behavior suggests that making 
comments to proposed agency rules is something of a clique behavior. 
 
Table 5.5 
Cross-tabulation for Same or Different Issue  
 
Same Issue 
or 
Different 
 CPS Subgroup  
 
Total 
Animal 
Rights 
Aircraft 
Over DC 
Re-entry 
Documents 
Toxic 
Chemicals 
Same Count 3 4 2 16 25 
  Percent 21.4% 16.0% 8.0% 42.1% 24.5% 
Different Count 11 21 23 22 77 
  Percent 78.6% 84.0% 92.0% 57.9% 75.5% 
Total  Count 14 25 25 38 102 
  Percent 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
It is possible that this clique behavior is merely a function of the particular issues 
involved in the rule proposals selected for this study.  If this were so, a set of 
environmentalists would make comments on environmental rule proposals and a different 
set of pet lovers would make comments on proposals concerning pets.  However, cross-
tabulation data presented above in Table 5.5 exhibit strong evidence to the contrary.  
Among the seven out of ten CPS respondents who reported making previous comments, 
more than three-fourths reported making comments on proposed rules involving different 
types of issues.  As might be expected, the environmentalists, represented by the Toxic 
Chemical subgroup, are the least likely to make comments on different issues, and the 
much less well-organized Re-entry Documents subgroup is the most likely to address 
other issues.  This is another indication of the impact of associational influences on 
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citizen participation in the N&C process.  A chi-square test displayed in Table C.5 in 
Appendix C indicates that differences in observed and expected frequencies are 
statistically significant.  However, as is the case with the previous variable, those 
significant differences are merely in the size of the majority.  Again, N&C respondents 
exhibit high rates of making comments on different types of rules and they tend to do so 
with relative consistency. 
 
Table 5.6a 
Cross-tabulation for How Comment Made  
 
 
 
How Comment Made 
 CPS Subgroup  
 
Total 
Animal 
Rights 
Aircraft 
Over DC 
Re-entry 
Documents 
Toxic 
Chemicals 
Agency Web Page Count 8 7 10 6 31 
  Percent 30.8% 19.4% 25.6% 15.0% 22.0% 
Regulations.gov Count   2 1   3 
  Percent   5.6% 2.6%   2.1% 
e-mail Count 12 22 17 28 79 
  Percent 46.2% 61.1% 43.6% 70.0% 56.0% 
Regular Mail Count 5 3 7 1 16 
  Percent 19.2% 8.3% 17.9% 2.5% 11.3% 
Other Count     2 1 3 
  Percent     5.1% 2.5% 2.1% 
Don't Remember Count 1 2 2 4 9 
  Percent 3.8% 5.6% 5.1% 10.0% 6.4% 
 Total Count 26 36 39 40 141 
  Percent 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
 
As noted previously, the last two administrations have focused on making 
government more accessible via the Internet.  Cross-tabulation data presented above in 
Table 5.6a provide evidence of the success of that effort.  Only slightly more than one in 
ten respondents report making their comment by regular mail.  While participants have 
moved substantially to the Internet, they may not be moving in the direction most 
efficient for agencies.  The majority of respondents report making their comments via e-
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mail.  This type of correspondence can be processed much more efficiently than paper.  
However, each comment requires additional handling to put the comment into a database.  
Agency web pages and the regulations.gov overlay network would do this automatically.  
Unfortunately, use of these web sites is relatively light, especially for the regulations.gov 
overlay.  Among the issue groups, the environmentalists are the least likely to use the 
more fully automated systems, possibly because these enhancements were not available 
when the environmental movement began using the Internet. 
 
Table 5.6b 
Cross-tabulation for Comment Made Via Internet  
 
 
Comment Made 
Via Internet 
 CPS Subgroup  
 
Total 
Animal 
Rights 
Aircraft 
Over DC 
Re-entry 
Documents 
Toxic 
Chemicals 
Yes Count 20 31 28 34 113 
  Percent 76.9% 86.1% 71.8% 85.0% 80.1% 
No Count 6 5 11 6 28 
  Percent 23.1% 13.9% 28.2% 15.0% 19.9% 
Total  Count 26 36 39 40 141 
  Percent 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
 
Due to the number of categories of answers, calculation of statistical significance 
for the data in Table 5.6a is problematic.  So, the number of categories is reduced to two 
in Table 5.6b above.  Eight out of ten respondents report using the Internet in some 
fashion.  The results of Chi-square testing are presented in Table C.6 in Appendix C.  The 
data indicate that the differences in observed and expected counts among the issue groups 
fail to achieve statistical significance.  The Internet is clearly the medium of choice for 
making comments to proposed agency rules for a wide range of issue groups. 
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Table 5.7 
Cross-tabulation for Ease of Making Comment by CPS Subgroup 
 
Ease of 
Making 
Comment 
 CPS Subgroup  
 
Total 
Animal 
Rights 
Aircraft 
Over DC 
Re-entry 
Documents 
Toxic 
Chemicals 
Easy Count 20 27 26 34 107 
  Percent 76.9% 75.0% 66.7% 85.0% 75.9% 
Moderate Count 6 8 13 5 32 
  Percent 23.1% 22.2% 33.3% 12.5% 22.7% 
Difficult Count   1   1 2 
  Percent   2.8%   2.5% 1.4% 
Total  Count 26 36 39 40 141 
  Percent 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Another piece of good news for agency planners is that three out of four citizen-
participants report that making their comment is easy.  As indicated in cross-tabulation 
results displayed in Table 5.7 above, only two CPS respondents describe the experience 
as difficult.  As expected, those experienced respondents of the Toxic Chemical group are 
the most likely to describe the experience as easy.  Given the relatively small differences 
in issue group results, it is not surprising that chi-square testing displayed in Table C.7 in 
Appendix C indicates that the differences in observed and expected counts fail to achieve 
statistical significance.  N&C participants routinely find the process of making comments 
to proposed agency rules to be relatively easy.  However, the question of how much of 
this ease is a product of the government's efforts to facilitate participation and how much 
is a function of interest group efforts remains unanswered. 
The picture that emerges from the foregoing data is that of a band of experienced 
political activists who use a specialized set of skills to achieve political objectives in a 
variety of issue venues.  Based on this data and the findings from the previous chapter, 
the compatibility of the notice and comment process with the democratic values liberty, 
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equality, and fairness is accessed in the next and final chapter.  Also, various proposed 
reforms are evaluated. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Conclusion 
 
Summary of Findings 
 
Summarizing the findings in the proceeding two chapters should put the question 
of this study into an appropriately narrow focus.  Socioeconomic and demographic data 
indicate that, compared to the average citizen of the American republic, participants in 
the notice and comment process are substantially and significantly different in aspects 
that usually indicate a higher social class.  N&C participants are: 1) about six years older 
than the mean of the ANES sample; 2) about thirty five percent more likely to be 
married; 3) about twice as likely to hold college or advanced degrees; 4) seventy eight 
percent more likely to be in the top three income groups; 5) twenty eight percent more 
likely to be White; and, 6) very unlikely to be Black.   
Association data indicate that N&C participants are better networked than the 
general public.  Participants in the N&C process are much more likely to belong to a non-
religious organization.  Among those who do belong to such an association, N&C 
participants are more likely to belong to substantially more such organizations.  Data on 
sources and uses of information indicate that notice and comment participants are much 
better informed than the general public.  They are more likely to watch the national news 
on television, read a daily newspaper, and have access to the Internet.   
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Data on political activity indicate that notice and comment participants are among 
our most active political participants.  Compared to the general public, they are: 1) more 
than three times as likely to contact a public official about a problem; 2) much more 
likely to attend a public meeting; 3) more than three times as likely to discuss politics 
with family and friends; 4) substantially more likely to listen to political talk radio; 5) 
much more likely to try to influence the vote of another person; 6) nearly three times as 
likely to attend a political campaign meeting; 7) more than half again as likely to display 
a campaign sign; 8) more than three times as likely to contribute to a candidate for public 
office; 9) about three times as likely to contribute to a political party; 10) nearly six times 
as likely to contribute to an organization, other than a political party, that attempts to 
influence elections; and, 11) even more likely to vote.  Importantly, the attitudes toward 
the political system of notice and comment participants differ substantially from those of 
the general public.  N&C participants exhibit much greater efficacy.  They are much less 
likely to indicate faith in the system of elections.  Finally, and understandably, they are 
much less likely to be concerned about the power of special interest groups. 
Although there is some variation among the subgroups, the range of variations 
usually fall beyond the 2004 NES mean.  But, it may be argued that while those who 
participate in agency rulemaking are unrepresentative of the general public, citizens who 
participate in elections are also unrepresentative of those who do not.  This is true.  But 
N&C participants are not only unrepresentative of the public, they are also 
unrepresentative of voters.  Data presented on the following page in Table 6.1 compare 
results of testing the original hypotheses using the entire ANES sample with results using 
only those ANES respondents who said they voted in the 2004 election.  If the problem 
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with representative democracy is that voters are not representative, direct citizen 
participation in federal agency rulemaking is an unrealistic reform because it is even 
more unrepresentative. 
 
Table 6.1  
Summary of Findings - Comparison of Results for Entire ANES and ANES Voters Only 
 
Hypothesis 
Number Variable Expectation 
Supported 
for Entire 
ANES 
Supported for 
ANES Voters 
Only 
1 Age Older Yes Yes 
2 Marital Status Married Yes Yes 
3 Education Higher Yes Yes 
4 Household Income Higher Yes Yes 
5 Race White Yes Yes 
6 Gender Male No Yes 
7 Association Membership Member Yes Yes 
8 Number of Associations More Yes Yes 
9 Watch National News More Yes No 
10 Watch Local News More No No 
11 Read Newspaper More Yes Yes 
12 Internet Access More Yes Yes 
13 Contact Government Official More Yes Yes 
14 Attend Public Meeting More Yes Yes 
15 Discuss Politics More Yes Yes 
16 Political Talk Radio More Yes Yes 
17 Influence Others More Yes Yes 
18 Attend Campaign Meetings More Yes Yes 
19 Campaign Signs More Yes Yes 
20 Contribute to Candidate More Yes Yes 
21 Contribute to Party More Yes Yes 
22 Contribute to Other Political Group More Yes Yes 
23 Vote More Yes Not Applicable 
24 People Like Me Don't Have Say Disagree Yes Yes 
25 Elections Make Government Pay Attention Disagree Yes Yes 
26 Government Controlled by Special Interests Agree Yes Yes 
 
 
None of these findings are new.  In fact, theories explaining political participation 
identified in several generations of quantitative political research are supported by these 
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findings.  So, our theories of what drives political participation are sound.  What remains 
is to apply this well documented knowledge to the particular question at hand and draw 
rational inferences. 
 
Implications of Findings for Democratic Values 
 
Liberty is important.  Arguably, the protection of individual liberty was the single 
most important goal of the Framers.  And, certainly, participation in the notice and 
comment process is an exercise of liberty for the participant.  All individuals and 
organizations, not merely citizens, may make a comment on any proposed rule, or they 
may choose not to do so.  However, as shown below, that does not demonstrate that 
participation in this process is necessary for individual liberty.   
The data indicate that N&C participants generally avail themselves of numerous 
opportunities to exercise their liberty to influence public policy by outperforming the 
average citizen in all of the eleven aspects political participation described above.  So, 
one must ask if one more way of demonstrating their preferences is really necessary to 
the political liberty of the notice and comment participant or of any citizen who might at 
some point in the future choose to participate in this process?  If that particular avenue of 
expressing her opinion were unavailable, is it reasonable to assume that a person so 
endowed with the political skills and experience that is common among these participants 
might not simply write a letter to her representative or call her senator?  The data indicate 
that there is a strong likelihood that she would.  In fact, by the time she decides to make 
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her comment, she has frequently exercised other means of participation to express her 
opinion on the issue at hand. 
If participation in the notice and comment process is not essential to political 
liberty, is it necessary to political equality?  Here, the data speak unambiguously.  Not 
only is this form of participation unnecessary for political equality, it virtually guarantees 
inequality.  Only a very small percentage of Americans actually participate in this process 
and the data indicate that those who do are drawn from the higher ranks of our social 
order.  Schattschneider observed that those who make the effort to have their voices 
heard tend to be from the more advantaged class.  He warned advocates of mass citizen 
participation that, “The flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with 
a strong upper-class accent” (p. 35).  Even the most ardent proponents of increasing 
public participation in agency decision making acknowledge this most predictable 
outcome.  Camilla Stivers, one of the original drafters of the Blacksburg Manifesto 
laments that: 
 
The advantage pluralism imparts to the organized and well equipped 
makes it difficult to envision a policy substantial role for ordinary citizens, 
one that goes beyond the advisory committee or coproduction.  Oligarchy 
is ubiquitous, and cooption appears inevitable (Wamsley, et al, p. 251). 
 
Citizens participate in public affairs when the interest of the community is 
demonstrably linked to the interest of the individual (Burtt).  Data indicate that those 
persons with more interests feel the pull of multiple links and tend to participate more 
frequently and in more ways.  From those experiences, they hone the skills necessary to 
become influential in the political process.  In contrast, the disadvantaged have fewer 
interests and, thereby, fewer links drawing them into the public sphere.  Thus, the 
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disadvantaged suffer from deficiencies in the basic skills and political experiences 
necessary for effective participation, especially in more advanced political activities such 
as influencing the federal bureaucracy.   
The remaining democratic value to be considered is fairness.  Rawls (1971) 
argues that the principal of equality may be violated so long as the weakest members of 
society benefit.  So, it might be argued that inequality in participation in federal agency 
rulemaking is justified because it benefits the disadvantaged.  The data provide no 
support for this assertion.  Four rule proposals were selected for this study based on 
criteria described previously.  The first deals with the regulation of the transportation and 
sale of ferrets.  While some disadvantaged persons might possibly own a ferret, is such 
regulation among those issues most frequently associated with the plight of the poor?  All 
of the commenters randomly selected for this study favored additional regulation.  It is 
hard to conceive of a way in which the restrictions proposed in this rule that would 
probably increase the cost of these rather exotic pets might substantially improve the lot 
of the poor. 
The next proposed rule would regulate private aircraft and general aviation 
airports in proximity to Washington, D. C. in order to limit opportunities for terrorists 
attacks against the nation's capital.  Few disadvantaged people own or travel by private 
aircraft.  Nor are they especially affected by restrictions on general aviation airports.  
However, many disadvantaged persons rely on some form of government assistance.  
Any incident of mass destruction in the federal district could severely disrupt the 
provision of government benefits.  It is revealing that those who commented on this rule 
proposal were almost unanimous in their opposition to the proposed regulation of private 
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aircraft in the federal district.  This subgroup had the highest percentage of respondents 
with family incomes over $120,000 and the lowest percentage with family incomes 
below $30,000.  More than two-thirds of respondents reported family incomes above 
$80,000.  While it is easy to see how the affluent are using the N&C process to protect 
their interest, it is difficult to visualize how any disadvantaged person might be positively 
affected by reductions in restrictions of the use of private aircraft that might hamper 
security efforts against terrorist threats to the federal district.   
The next rule proposal would require a passport for re-entry to the United States 
when returning from selected locations in North America as part of the effort to make 
entrance by terrorists more difficult.  The overwhelming majority of commenters opposed 
this rule.  Many commenters on this proposal stated that they were retired persons on 
fixed incomes and could not afford a passport for international travel.  Interestingly, more 
than two-thirds of respondents in this subgroup reported family incomes of $50,000 or 
greater.  It is almost certain that requiring a passport when none has been required in the 
past would increase the cost of international travel.  Yet, it is somewhat difficult to 
understand how international travel would constitute a substantial portion of the family 
budgets of the truly disadvantaged.  Again, it is much easier to understand how the 
disadvantaged would be the most vulnerable to economic disruptions caused by terrorist 
intrigues.  So, to the extent that requiring a passport might reduce the likelihood of 
terrorist access, the proposed rule would appear to benefit the disadvantaged.   
The final rule proposal would change reporting requirements for toxic chemicals 
stored at business locations.  As with the previous case, commenters overwhelmingly 
opposed the change.  Again, more than two-thirds of respondents in this subgroup 
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reported family incomes of $50,000 or more.  While one might offer the argument that 
the disadvantaged would be in greatest jeopardy from the accidental release of toxic 
chemicals, this proposed change merely affected the form on which the chemicals would 
be reported and the reporting interval.  Any increase in risk for the public would be 
extremely small, if not imaginary.  Likewise, any savings the businesses might gain from 
the change are projected to be minimal.  In this case, there would be very little risk and 
very little reward for the public in general or the disadvantaged, and this may be an 
anomaly.  Socioeconomic data from the Toxic Chemicals subgroup support a postulate 
that concern for the environment is a middle class phenomenon.  While the exact 
relationship between environmental regulation and economic outcomes is a controversial 
subject, it appears that the disadvantaged bear greater burdens from environmental 
reforms in terms of lost job opportunities and achieve fewer tangible benefits (Jaffe et al, 
1995).   
So, the data provide no substantial evidence of benefit for the disadvantaged.  
There is not a single case in which the actions of the more advantaged citizens who 
participate in the notice and comment process may be seriously construed as doing 
anything of substance to improve the lot of the disadvantaged.  Perhaps this is due to an 
unintended bias in the selection process for the rule proposals.  After all, the number of 
comments was the primary consideration for selection of a proposed rule.  Rule proposals 
which attract a large number of comments are unusual.  Kerwin reports that most 
proposed rules deal with narrow business issues and many garner few comments.  So, 
while this study cannot exclude the possibility that some set of advantaged commenters 
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might do something to help some disadvantaged person or group at some time, it does 
provide evidence of the unlikelihood of such an outcome.   
Public participation in agency decision-making is not essential to liberty.  It is 
destructive of equality, and no evidence is found demonstrating an impact on improving 
the lot of the disadvantaged.  So, why is public participation hawked by politicians and 
public administrators as the panacea for America's ills?  In both cases, the answer may be 
nothing more than self-interest.  Politicians strive for reelection.  When decisions are 
made by many, responsibility is divided and accountability is uncertain.  Likewise, 
agencies compete for the allocation of scarce resources.  Influential clients lobby 
Congress to increase allotments to agencies providing their succor.   
 
Too Much of A Good Thing 
 
Political analyst Fareed Zakaria (2004) was born and raised in India.  So, he views 
America through the eyes of an immigrant, not wedded to the status quo through 
patriotism or pride of history.  Zakaria observes that American politicians are masters of 
pandering, filling their public statements with praise of the "... wisdom, courage, 
rectitude, and all-around greatness of the American people" (p. 167).  He argues that 
public participation is a good thing, but America suffers from too much of a good thing.   
As barriers to public participation have fallen at all levels of government, the 
public has responded by expressing in public opinion polls considerably lower levels of 
trust in government.  Most importantly, as trust has declined, voting rates have dropped, 
in spite of substantial efforts to increase voting participation through such structural 
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reforms as the Motor Voter Act and abolition of Jim Crow laws.  To Zakaria, this decline 
poses a dangerous problem for the republic. 
Voting is not only the one universal act of citizenship in a free society, it is 
also one of the least demanding... Disenchantment with their political 
system is palpable in the way Americans vote, respond to public opinion 
polls, write letters to the editor, talk on television, and indeed express 
themselves anywhere in any form (p. 163).  
 
Zarkaria blames this American malaise on what he calls the democratization of 
politics.   
Since the 1960s most aspects of American politics - political parties, 
legislatures, administrative agencies, and even courts - have opened 
themselves up to greater public contact and influence in a conscious effort 
to become more democratic in structure and spirit.  And curiously, more 
than any other, this change seems to coincide with the decline in standing 
of these very institutions (p. 166). 
 
However, the public sees the problem in exactly the opposite light.  When survey 
respondents read a statement that "nobody listens to people like me," it appears to be an 
accurate assessment of political institutions to many Americans.  And, Zarakia thinks 
that, for the average person, this may be true. 
There is truth in these observations, in the sense that organized groups - 
special interests - now run Washington, but what Americans often do not 
realize is that this is a direct consequence of the changes of the last few 
decades.  The more open a system becomes, the more easily it can be 
penetrated by money, lobbyists, and fanatics.  What has changed in 
Washington is not that politicians have closed themselves off from the 
American people and are unwilling to hear their pleas.  It is that they do 
scarcely anything but listen to the American people. (p. 166). 
 
All the King's Horses and All the King's Men 
 
So, not only does public participation in agency rulemaking fail to deliver on 
democratic values, the general effect of too much public participation may very well be 
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to weaken representative democracy.  To reverse this trend would require political 
leadership and courage.  Both are unlikely in a polarized political culture in which the 
balance may shift with one ill-timed faux pas.  Besides, political participation, while 
often an extra-constitutional adjunct to representative democracy, has become a valued 
component of American democracy.  Any effort to reduce it would be seen as an assault 
on individual liberty.  Equally important, public input is necessary in the complex 
administrative state.  As government attempts to enter more areas previously reserved to 
the private sector or the individual, frequently at the behest of its clients, it needs 
information.  Certainly, representatives and senators need input on priorities and 
alternatives.  Likewise, agencies that are charged with determining the details of 
regulation must have some means of gathering information from the individuals and 
groups they regulate.   
A quick look at the U. S. Department of Transportation docket clarifies this need.  
Various agencies within the department are, as of this writing, accepting comments on a 
variety of rule proposals.  FAA-2007-27390 would provide regulations for amateur 
rocket activities.  FAA-2007-28172 would certify the General Electric Company's CF6-
80C2A5T turbofan engine for commercial airline use.  FRA-2007-28699 would allow the 
modification of a signaling system in use by the Canadian National Railway Company.  
NHTSA-2007-28138 would modify standards for a tire quality grading system.  PHMSA-
2007-28136 provides safety regulations for hazardous liquids pipelines transporting 
ethanol and other bio-fuels (Department of Transportation).  Similarly, dozens of other 
agencies are considering a multitude of rules.  Given the resource limits imposed on 
agencies by budget constraints, how might any agency reside sufficient expertise to 
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perform the tasks assigned to it in such wide-ranging rulemaking without drawing on 
private sources? 
The notice and comment process provides not only access to information but also 
a viable avenue for participation for interested members of the public.  Also, from public 
participation, agencies stake a claim to institutional legitimacy.  So, how might we fix 
Humpty Dumpty in such a way that the process and the public policy outcomes have a 
positive impact on liberty, equality, and fairness?  One reform that will not be considered 
is limiting congressional delegation to administrative agencies.  As stated earlier, the 
complex regulatory state is a matter of fact, not an alternative.  We are where we find 
ourselves.  So, only reforms addressing the notice and comment process are considered.   
The APA provides for both the informal rulemaking associated with the notice 
and comment process and formal rulemaking in which a more adversarial process is 
required.  In truth, the more relaxed procedures of informal rulemaking have fallen into 
disuse.  Harter (1982) identifies the inability to establish consensus on the appropriate 
mix of discretion and procedural constraint as the driver of what he calls hybrid 
rulemaking.  He argues that hybrid rulemaking has effectively replaced informal 
rulemaking and has become a surrogate for direct participation in the political decisions.   
Harter points to defects in the adversarial process of both formal and hybrid 
rulemaking.  First, both agencies and interested parties take extreme positions so that as 
the process pushes them toward a more relaxed position, they will not loose what they 
consider to be essential points.  Next, participants are less likely to make full disclosure 
of information because some data might undermine their position in subsequent litigation.  
This fear of the almost certain litigation that follows rulemaking causes the agency and 
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the interested parties to raise more issues than are necessary to resolve the matter at hand 
because all parties see a need to build a defensible record.  Interested parties talk to the 
agency, not to each other, and seldom are allowed to reach a mutually acceptable 
compromise.  Finally, all parties engage in extra research activities so as to be able to 
defend their positions against any attack.  Harter concludes that these factors cause high 
costs for all parties and extended duration for the rulemaking process. 
One of the more radical reforms implemented to date is negotiated rulemaking.  
Noting the strong support for this reform both in Congress and in the Oval Office, 
Coglianese (2005) describes the procedure and its goals as an adjunct to informal 
rulemaking. 
Negotiated rulemaking supplements the notice-and-comment procedures 
of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) with a negotiation process that 
takes place before an agency issues a proposed regulation.  The agency 
establishes a committee comprised of representatives from regulated 
firms, trade associations, citizens groups, and other affected organizations, 
as well as members of the agency staff.  The committee meets publicly to 
negotiate the proposed rule.  If the committee reaches consensus, the 
agency typically adopts the consensus rule as its proposed rule and then 
proceeds according to the notice-and-comment procedures specified in the 
APA (p. 1). 
 
Harter argues that in negotiated rulemaking, the direct participation of the parties 
reduces the cost and delay of current rulemaking by directly involving more decision 
makers and fewer intermediaries.  This allows decision makers to focus on substantive 
issues rather than building a record for litigation.  However, the applicability of this 
method is limited to those cases in which compromise is possible, and Harter points out 
that many regulations fall into the category of winner-take-all.   
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But, Harter argues that, where used appropriately, the resulting regulations would 
be superior to the products of more adversarial processes.   
Direct participation in rulemaking through negotiations is preferable to 
entrusting the decision to the wisdom and judgment of the agency, which 
is essential under the basic provisions of the APA, or to relying on more 
formal, structured method of hybrid rulemaking in which it is difficult for 
anyone to make the careful trade offs necessary for enlightened regulation.  
A regulation that is developed by and has the support of the respective 
interests would have a political legitimacy that regulations developed 
under any other process arguably lack (p. 2). 
 
Looking at negotiated rulemaking after it was firmly established as a preferred 
option for federal agencies, Coglianese found no support for claims that this reform 
would reduce either the duration of rulemaking or the likelihood of litigation.  In fact, 
negotiated rules made by the EPA, the agency that has used this method most frequently, 
took longer and produced more legal challenges than rules the agency made through its 
more traditional procedures.  But, whether or not it delivers the advantages promised, 
what impact might negotiated rulemaking have on democratic values?   
Since the agency is required only to invite key stakeholders to participate in the 
negotiation, the liberty of any other individual to participate would be limited.  From the 
standpoint of equality, it would absolutely assure inequality because the term "key 
stakeholder" seldom translates into wage earner, taxpayer, or disadvantaged person.  
Even if one or more public members were to be included in the mix, it is most doubtful 
that disinterested non-experts would be sufficiently motivated and prepared to contest 
with principals possessing vastly superior resources and motivation.   
So, would these principals, in spite of the inequality of their selection, be expected 
to act in the best interest of the disadvantaged?  Since there is little empirical evidence 
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that President Reagan's trickle-down economics would apply to the more narrow case of 
rich and powerful principals of negotiated rulemaking, this is a question that turns on 
assessments of human nature.  John Locke (1988), considered by the Framers to be 
something of an expert in that area, reminds us, "...That it is unreasonable for Men to be 
Judges in their own Cases, that Self-love will make Men partial to themselves and their 
Friends: and on the other side, that Ill Nature, Passion and Revenge will carry them too 
far in punishing others..." (p. 275).  According to social contract theory, this is the very 
reason that men voluntarily leave the state of nature and form government, "... to restrain 
the partiality and violence of Men" (p. 276).  William West (2004) describes negotiated 
rulemaking as, "... a corporatist abdication of public authority to private interests" (p. 74).  
If this is an accurate assessment, government's abdication puts the general public into a 
virtual state of nature vis-á-vie those deciding their own cases.  It is most doubtful that 
lambs will fare well in a contest with lions.   
One of the more radical reforms to receive any serious discussion involves 
creating a separate agency to specialize in securing public comment for the rules 
proposals of all other agencies.  Cuèllar sees the problem with public participation as one 
of differing levels of technical and political sophistication.  
An independent agency could be created to run public consultations to 
supplement existing rulemaking regulations.  It could use random or 
stratified random sampling to select people to consult, either during notice 
and comment or earlier in the design of regulatory programs.  It could 
weigh and use various procedures to structure the provision of information 
to participants.  Lawyers working as 'regulatory public defenders' for the 
independent agency could articulate the different views of the people 
consulted for inclusion in the rulemaking record, thereby helping to 
remedy sophistication deficits (p. 491). 
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This is an interesting proposal if for no other reason than it attempts to integrate 
the efforts of lawyers, social scientists, and bureaucrats to create something of a public 
opinion jury on highly technical matters.  While it is most doubtful that the existing 
agencies would support any effort to reduce their control of their rulemaking, probably 
the most glaring defect in practically applying such a proposal is not a sophistication 
deficit, although one certainly exists.  Even if these regulatory public defenders could 
bring average or below average citizens up to speed on cutting edge technological 
questions, they would almost certainly lack the capacity to engender in these randomly 
selected public participants an interest in doing so.  Most citizens, especially the 
disadvantaged, simply are not interested in the details or technology of some randomly 
selected rule proposal.   
Likewise, most citizens do not live in or around Washington, D. C.  So, it would 
be necessary to disrupt the lives of ordinary citizens, take them far from home, educate 
them on matters for which they probably have no interest, and hold them in this state for 
some extended period of time.  Either those selected would appear as hired participants, 
with all of the bias issues that might entail, or they would be forced to serve through 
some process of compulsion not revealed in Cuèllar's proposal.  This proposal might 
improve the chances of equality through the use of social science, but at what expense to 
individual liberty and fairness?   
Cuèllar also proposes the use of on-line surveys to facilitate the process of 
gathering public opinion.  While that idea might avoid the rather unappealing prospects 
of either compulsory public participation or citizen participation for hire, it would still 
depend on the interest of participants.  Average and less advantaged citizens do not sense 
120 
  
 
that they have a dog in the fight when agencies decide complex technical issues like the 
certification of turbofan aircraft engines or tire grading systems. 
Often agencies are required to make rules on technical issues where there is no 
consensus within the scientific community.  Harter describes a proposal for a science 
court as a means to resolve such technical issues.  A tribunal of experts would be 
assembled by the agency and interested parties would present their evidence in an 
adversarial manner.  Based on the weight of evidence, the science court would decide the 
issue and the agency would use their findings as the factual basis for its regulation.   
On the surface, a science court appears to offer a reform that might actually speed 
up the rulemaking process at little cost to liberty, equality, or fairness.  Making rules 
based on good science sounds like good policy for everyone.  But, there are at least two 
problems.  First, there is the selection process for the judges.  The agency must select 
scientists based on some criteria.  If the current debate over global warming teaches us 
anything, it is that scientists and agencies are not without bias.  Proponents of the human-
effects theories of global warming accuse scientists expounding natural-effects theories 
of selling out to the energy industry.  Natural-effects scientists counter-charge that 
human-effects advocates are biased by EPA grants, which fund research aimed at proving 
human causes of global warming. 
Even if we were able to overcome bias in a particular issue area, the science court 
reform remains fatally flawed.  Thomas Kuhn (1962) explains that science does not 
operate by courts or majority rule.  In every case of a great discovery, the accumulated 
wisdom of science as well as the power of the dons has been arrayed against the genius of 
a Newton, a Galileo, or a Curie.  Science changes if and only if a new theory explains 
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more than the existing theory.  The process is extended and it is unlikely that it could be 
constrained to bear its fruits within the normal duration of rulemaking.  If we accept that 
good science might be an advantage to all, we must acknowledge the antithesis that bad 
science would be a detriment for all.  Science by rule of a majority of a handpicked court 
is simply bad science. 
A final reform to be considered seeks to return the informal rulemaking process to 
the original intent expressed in the APA.  William West (2004) describes the evolution of 
legal environment of the notice and comment process as it progressed from a method of 
getting input to a method of justifying agency decisions.   
 
The framers of the APA viewed rulemaking as an extension of the 
legislative process.  Much like testimony at committee meetings, public 
comment was intended to provide information that administrators could 
use as they saw fit.  Its advisory role was reflected in the act's 'arbitrary 
and capricious' standard of judicial review, which originally was 
interpreted as requiring only some reasonable basis for an agency 
decision.  Since the 1960s, however, many regulatory enabling statutes 
(the procedural constraints of which supercede the APA) have required 
administrators to justify their policies on the basis of 'substantial evidence' 
in the record (p. 67). 
 
Since the 1970s, lower federal courts, and especially the D. C. Circuit, have 
sought to protect accountability and participation by subjecting agency rules to a hard 
look, originally reserved to the more adversarial formal rulemaking process.  While the 
Supreme Court has been critical of the lower courts, its own decisions have proven 
ambiguous, eschewing the minimal requirements of the APA, and requiring agencies to 
justify their policy decisions in a record of the decision process (William West, 2004).   
Agencies find themselves in a no-win situation.  Bureaucracy is, of necessity, 
subject to political accountability, which refers to the ability of Congress and the 
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president to control rulemaking activities.  Courts require procedural or instrumental 
accountability that in turn requires agencies to consider public comment and to produce 
rational rules based on the record of information gathered.  So, William West (2004) 
concludes that: 
The tensions between the instrumental accountability that due process 
demands and the political accountability demanded of bureaucracy when it 
makes general policy decisions suggests that it is desirable to return to the 
original conception of public comment as an aid to decision making that 
bureaucrats can use at their discretion (p. 67). 
 
As the battle between competing interests, as well as between the constitutional 
branches of government, for supremacy in rulemaking has raged, one important idea 
seems to have been lost.  William West (2004) argues that the goal of rulemaking is to 
make accurate rules in accordance with public needs.  Access to good information would 
facilitate that end.  Likewise, a reduction in judicial oversight might actually allow 
agencies to exhibit greater flexibility during the notice and comment process.  To 
accomplish these reforms, Congress would have to modify requirements in numerous 
pieces of enabling legislation to coincide with APA requirements and the lower federal 
courts would have to abrogate the hard look doctrine that exceeds the APA requirements. 
Such changes would not be easy to accomplish, but of all the reforms being 
seriously considered, this might have positive results in terms of liberty, equality, and 
fairness.  Liberty would not be compromised.  Any person or group that wished to 
participate could do so.  Mandatory service on a jury for numerous months or years 
would be unnecessary.  While equality would not be guaranteed, special interests would 
no longer enjoy legal sanctions requiring their voices to be included in agency decisions.  
So, as this form of participation becomes less profitable, it would likely be used less by 
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the privileged and their lobbyists.  That outcome alone would serve to amplify the voices 
of any average or disadvantaged citizens who choose to take an interest in a particular 
proposal.   
Likewise, untangling the web of actors involved in the policy process by limiting 
the role of the courts would serve to make all participants more accountable for their 
actions and for the outcome of the process.  Presently, no individual, agency, legislative 
body, or executive can be held accountable because of the virtual certainty of judicial 
influence.  The agency did or did not do something because a court made it or because it 
expected a court would make it do so.  So, the only people who might be accountable to 
voters conceal themselves behind black robes.  Because low-cost political participation, 
like voting, is more likely among average and disadvantaged voters, accountability serves 
the interest of equality, even if imperfectly. 
But, how might returning to the original intent of the APA serve fairness?  There 
will always be inequality where there is liberty because it is the natural product of 
freedom and human nature.  Politicians, bureaucrats, and special interests will continue to 
dominate the rulemaking process, whatever reforms are accomplished.  Perhaps the only 
true solace the disadvantaged may hope for is the Second Coming or, even less likely, a 
powerful politician who sincerely and selflessly cares about their interests.  Until then, 
living under laws made by others may be their lot.  Living under good laws would be 
preferable to living under bad ones.  The present system of agency rulemaking virtually 
assures that procedural considerations will dominate substantive concerns.  Freeing 
bureaucrats to make the best possible decision based on the best available information 
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and holding them accountable to the elected representatives of the people, as Madison 
and his peers designed in the Constitution, may be our best hope for fairness. 
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Appendix A 
 
2007 CITIZEN PARTICIPATION SURVEY 
 
According to agency records, you made a comment on the proposed rule 
concerning (rule description).  The following questions relate to your 
experiences in making that comment. 
 
Were you able to get sufficient information  
about the subject from government sources?  _____ Yes _____ No 
 
Did any organization involved in influencing  
the outcome of this rulemaking process ask  
you to make your comment?    _____ Yes _____ No 
 
Did you contact any ELECTED OFFICIAL about  
this particular issue?     _____ Yes _____ No 
 
Prior to making this comment, have you ever  
made a comment to a proposed agency rule?  _____ Yes _____ No 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
By what means did you make your comment? 
 
_____ Agency web page  _____ regulations.gov  _____ e-mail  
 
_____ Regular mail  _____ Other    _____ Don't remember  
________________________________________________________________ 
 
How would you rate the ease  
of making your comment?   
 
_____Easy     _____Moderate       _____ Difficult  
________________________________________________________________ 
 
Many people belong to business, labor, social, professional, and civic 
associations or groups that focus on particular issues.   
 
Not counting membership in a local church  
or synagogue, are you a member of any of  
these kinds of organizations?     _____ Yes _____ No 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
How many such organizations are you currently a member of?  __________ 
 
________________________________________________________________ 
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Many people say that they have less time these days.  How about you? 
Other than the comment you made on the proposed rule mentioned above, 
during the LAST 12 MONTHS, have you done any of the following? 
 
Telephoned, written to, or visited a  
government official to express your views?  _____ Yes _____ No 
 
Attended a community meeting about an  
issue facing your community or schools?  _____ Yes _____ No 
 
Discussed politics with your family or friends?  _____ Yes _____ No 
 
Listened to political talk radio programs?   _____ Yes _____ No 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
Next, we need to understand how participation in the rulemaking process 
might be related to other types of political activity.  The next few questions 
relate to various types of political involvement. 
 
During the 2006 ELECTION cycle, did you do any of the following? 
 
Talk to other people and try to show them 
why they should vote for or against one of  
the parties or candidates?     _____ Yes _____ No 
 
Go to any political meetings, rallies, speeches,  
dinners, or things like that in support of a  
particular candidate?     _____ Yes _____ No 
 
Wear a campaign button, put a campaign  
sticker on your car, or place a sign in your  
window or in front of your house?    _____ Yes _____ No 
 
Give money to an INDIVIDUAL CANDIDATE 
running for public office?     _____ Yes _____ No 
 
Give money to a POLITICAL PARTY?   _____ Yes _____ No 
 
Give money to ANY OTHER GROUP that  
supported or opposed candidates?   _____ Yes _____ No 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
Did you vote in the 2006 election?   _____ Yes _____ No 
________________________________________________________________ 
135 
  
 
 
The next few questions deal with information sources. 
 
During the PAST WEEK, how many days did you do one of the following: 
 
               Please circle a number of days 
 
Watch national news on television? 0     1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
 
Watch local news on television?  0     1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
 
Read a daily newspaper?   0     1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Do you have access to the Internet?  _____ Yes _____ No 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Please circle the number that best expresses your agreement or disagreement 
with the statement. 
 
     Strongly               Strongly 
     Agree         Agree    Undecided      Disagree       Disagree  
 
I can trust the government in  
Washington, D. C. to do what  
is right.       1          2  3        4    5 
 
 
Government is run by a few  
big interests.       1          2  3         4    5 
 
 
People like me don't have any  
say in what government does.    1          2  3         4    5 
 
 
Elections make government  
pay attention to what the people  
think.         1          2  3         4    5 
________________________________________________________________ 
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The following section deals with demographic information similar to that 
collected in the census.  The information you provide will be used 
exclusively for academic research and your identity will remain completely 
anonymous. 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
In what year were you born?   __________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
What is your present marital status? _____ Married  _____ Not Married 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
What is the highest grade of school or  
year of college you completed?   _______  
 
(high school graduate = 12, college freshman = 13, 16 = college graduate, etc.) 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
Are you employed by the federal, state,  
or local government?    ___ Yes ___ No 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
Which of the following best describes your annual household income? 
 
___ 0 - $29,999                   ___ $30,000 - $49,999            ___ $50,000 - $79,999 
 
___ $80,000 - $104,999      ___ $105,000 - $119,999        ___ $120,000 or more 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
What racial or ethnic group best describes you? 
 
___ Black                          ___ Asian                      ___ Native American 
 
___ Hispanic                     ___ White                     ___ Other 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
What is your gender?        ___ Female                 ___ Male 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
Please place your survey in the envelope provided and mail it today.   
 
Thank you! 
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Appendix B 
 
Statistical Tables Not Included in the Text of Chapter 4 
 
 
Table B.1a 
Independent Samples t-Test for Age by Sample 
 
 
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Sig.  
(2-tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
        Lower Upper 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 19.952 .000 
-
4.083 1337 .000 -6.15 1.51 -9.11 -3.2 
Equal 
variances 
not assumed   
-
4.997 195.765 .000 -6.15 1.23 -8.58 -3.72 
 
 
Table B.1b  
Analysis of Variance for Age by CPS Subgroup 
 
 Sum of 
Squares 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Mean 
Square 
 
F 
 
Significance 
Between Groups 2852.753 3 950.918 5.969 .001 
Within Groups 21505.261 135 159.298     
Total 24358.014 138       
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Table B.1c  
Dunnett C Multiple Comparisons for Age by CPS Subgroup 
 
 
 
 
(I) CPS Subgroup 
 
 
 
(J) CPS Subgroup 
Mean Difference 
(I-J) 
Standard 
Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
  Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Animal Rights Aircraft Over DC -5.34 3.29 -14.14 3.46 
  Re-entry Documents -12.27* 3.25 -21.12 -3.42 
  Toxic Chemicals -10.78* 3.22 -19.56 -2.00 
Aircraft Over DC Animal Rights 5.34 3.29 -3.46 14.14 
  Re-entry Documents -6.93 2.94 -14.77 .91 
  Toxic Chemicals -5.44 2.90 -13.20 2.32 
Re-entry Documents Animal Rights 12.27* 3.25 3.42 21.12 
  Aircraft Over DC 6.93 2.94 -.91 14.77 
  Toxic Chemicals 1.49 2.86 -6.33 9.31 
Toxic Chemicals Animal Rights 10.78* 3.22 2.00 19.56 
  Aircraft Over DC 5.44 2.90 -2.32 13.20 
  Re-entry Documents -1.49 2.86 -9.31 6.33 
*  The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. 
 
 
Table B.2a 
Chi-Square Tests for Marital Status by Sample 
 
  
Value 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 16.554 1 .000 
Number of Valid Cases 1350     
0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 64.66. 
 
 
Table B.2b 
Chi square Test for Marital Status by CPS Subgroup 
 
   
Value 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 2.768 3 .429 
Number of Valid Cases 139     
0 cells (.0%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 7.55. 
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Table B.3a 
Chi-Square Tests for Education Category by Sample 
 
  
Value 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 60.531 2 .000 
Number of Valid Cases 1349     
0 cells (.0%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 39.46. 
 
 
Table B.3b 
Chi-Square Test for Education Categories by CPS Subgroup 
 
   
Value 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 10.795 6 .095 
Number of Valid Cases 139     
Three cells (25.0%) have expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.24. 
 
 
Table B.4a 
Chi-Square Test for Family Income by Sample 
 
   
Value 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 30.332 5 .000 
Number of Valid Cases 1202     
0 cells (.0%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.49. 
 
 
Table B.4b 
Chi-Square Test for Family Income by CPS Subgroup 
 
  
Value 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 7.097 6 .312 
Number of Valid Cases 132     
0 cells (.0%) have an expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 6.27. 
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Table B.5a 
Chi-Square Test for White and Non-White by Sample 
 
   
Value 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 27.614 1 .000 
Number of Valid Cases 1340     
0 cells (.0%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 34.20. 
 
 
Table B.5b 
Chi-Square Test for Race by CPS Subgroup 
 
  
Value 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 3.594 3 .309 
Number of Valid Cases 136     
4 cells (50.0%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.65. 
 
 
Table B.6a 
Chi-Square Test for Gender by Sample 
 
  
Value 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 2.906 1 .088 
Number of Valid Cases 1350     
0 cells (.0%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 65.52. 
 
 
Table B.6b 
Chi-Square Test for Gender by CPS Subgroup 
 
   
Value 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 48.991 3 .000 
Number of Valid Cases 138     
0 cells (.0%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 11.41. 
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Table B.7a 
Chi-Square Test for Organization Membership by Sample 
 
 
  
 
Value 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 32.980 1 .000 
Number of Valid Cases 1206     
0 cells (.0%) have expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 63.13. 
 
 
Table B.7b 
Chi-Square Test for Organization Membership by CPS Subgroup 
 
  
Value 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 20.469 3 .000 
Number of Valid Cases 141     
0 cells (.0%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 8.48. 
 
 
Table B.8a 
Independent Samples t-test for Number of Organizations by Sample 
 
 
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
       Lower Upper 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
33.565 .000 -5.499 538 .000 -1.34 .24 -1.81 -.86 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
    -3.294 100.452 .001 -1.34 .41 -2.14 -.53 
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Table B.8b 
Analysis of Variance for Number of Organizations by CPS Subgroup 
 
 Sum of 
Squares 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Mean 
Square 
F Significance 
Between Groups 113.509 3 37.836 2.628 .055 
Within Groups 1310.112 91 14.397     
Total 1423.621 94       
 
 
Table B.9a 
Independent Samples t-Test for Number of Days Watched National News on TV by 
Sample 
 
Number of Days 
Watched 
National News 
on TV 
Levene's 
Test for 
Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Standard 
Error 
Difference 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
        Lower Upper 
Equal variances 
assumed .429 .513 
-
2.211 1348 .027 -.54 .25 -1.03 .006 
Equal variances 
not assumed   
-
2.244 174.103 .026 -.54 .24 -1.02 .007 
 
 
Table B.9b 
One-Way Analysis of Variance for Days Watched National News on TV by CPS 
Subgroup 
 
 Sum of 
Squares 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Mean 
Square 
 
F 
 
Significance. 
Between Groups 50.025 3 16.675 2.331 .077 
Within Groups 972.910 136 7.154     
Total 1022.936 139       
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Table B.10a 
Independent Samples t-Test for Number of Days Watched Local News by Sample 
 
  Levene's Test 
for Equality 
of Variances 
 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
 
 
F 
 
 
Sig. 
 
 
t 
 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
 
Significance 
(2-tailed) 
 
Mean 
Difference 
Standard 
Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
              Lower Upper 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
2.658 .103 1.988 1347 .047 .49 .25 .0007 .98 
Equal 
variances 
not assumed 
    2.067 174.874 .040 .49 .24 .002 .96 
 
 
Table B.10b 
Descriptive Statistics for Days Watched Local News by CPS Subgroup 
 
 
 
 
Subgroup 
 
Number 
 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Standard 
Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
 
Min. 
 
Max. 
    Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
  
Animal Rights 26 4.23 2.45 .48 3.24 5.22 0 7 
Aircraft Over DC 36 3.56 2.52 .42 2.70 4.41 0 7 
Re-entry Documents 39 5.03 2.29 .37 4.28 5.77 0 7 
Toxic Chemicals 38 3.13 2.92 .47 2.17 4.09 0 7 
Total 139 3.98 2.65 .22 3.53 4.42 0 7 
 
 
Table B.10c  
One-Way Analysis of Variance for Days Watched Local News by CPS Subgroup 
 
 Sum of 
Squares 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Mean 
Square 
 
F 
 
Significance 
Between Groups 78.115 3 26.038 3.955 .010 
Within Groups 888.821 135 6.584     
Total 966.935 138       
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Table B.10d 
Dunnett C Multiple Comparisons for Days Watched Local News on TV by CPS 
Subgroup 
 
 
 
 
 
(I) CPS Subgroup 
 
 
 
 
(J) CPS Subgroup 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
 
Standard 
Error 
 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
  Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Animal Rights Aircraft Over DC .68 .66 -1.07 2.42 
  Re-entry Documents -.79 .65 -2.44 .85 
  Toxic Chemicals 1.10 .65 -.74 2.94 
Aircraft Over DC Animal Rights -.68 .66 -2.42 1.07 
  Re-entry Documents -1.47 .59 -2.97 .003 
  Toxic Chemicals .42 .60 -1.28 2.13 
Re-entry Documents Animal Rights .79 .65 -.85 2.44 
  Aircraft Over DC 1.47 .59 -.003 2.97 
  Toxic Chemicals 1.89* .58 .28 3.51 
Toxic Chemicals Animal Rights -1.10 .65 -2.94 .74 
  Aircraft Over DC -.42 .60 -2.13 1.28 
  Re-entry Documents -1.89* .58 -3.51 -.28 
*  The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. 
 
 
Table B.11a 
Independent Samples t-Test for Days Read Daily Newspaper by Sample 
 
 Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances 
 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
 
 
 
F 
 
 
Sig. 
 
 
t 
Degrees 
of 
Freedom 
 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
 
Mean 
Difference 
 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
       Lower Upper 
Equal variances 
assumed 
1.128 .288 -4.510 1350 .000 -1.15 .26 -1.66 -.65 
Equal variances 
not assumed 
    -4.700 176.602 .000 -1.15 .25 -1.64 -.67 
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Table B.11b 
One-Way Analysis of Variance for Days Read Daily Newspaper by CPS Subgroup 
 
 Sum of 
Squares 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Mean 
Square 
 
F 
 
Significance 
Between Groups 100.585 3 33.528 4.861 .003 
Within Groups 938.100 136 6.898     
Total 1038.686 139       
 
 
Table B.11c 
Dunnett C Multiple Comparisons for Days Read Daily Newspaper by CPS Subgroup  
 
 
 
 
(I) CPS Subgroup 
 
 
 
(J) CPS Subgroup 
 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
 
 
Standard 
Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Animal Rights Aircraft Over DC -1.66 .68 -3.46 .15 
  Re-entry Documents -2.31* .66 -4.08 -.54 
  Toxic Chemicals -2.23* .66 -3.99 -.47 
Aircraft Over DC Animal Rights 1.66 .68 -.15 3.46 
  Re-entry Documents -.65 .61 -2.31 1.01 
  Toxic Chemicals -.57 .61 -2.22 1.07 
Re-entry Documents Animal Rights 2.31* .66 .54 4.08 
  Aircraft Over DC .65 .61 -1.01 2.31 
  Toxic Chemicals .008 .59 -1.53 1.69 
Toxic Chemicals Animal Rights 2.23* .66 .47 3.99 
  Aircraft Over DC .57 .61 -1.07 2.22 
  Re-entry Documents -.008 .59 -1.69 1.53 
*  The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. 
 
 
Table B.12a 
Chi-Square Test for Internet Access by Sample 
 
  
Value 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 40.332 1 .000 
Number of Valid Cases 1207     
0 cells (.0%) have expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 35.86. 
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Table B.12b  
Chi-Square Test for Internet Access by CPS Subgroup 
 
  
Value 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 7.542 3 .056 
Number of Valid Cases 141     
4 cells (50.0%) have expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is .92. 
 
 
Table B.13 a 
Chi-Square Test for Contact Government Official by Sample 
 
  
Value 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 168.406 1 .000 
Number of Valid Cases 1205     
0 cells (.0%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 37.26. 
 
 
Table B.13b 
Chi-Square Test for Contacting Government Officials by CPS Subgroup 
 
  
Value 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 9.814 3 .020 
Number of Valid Cases 139     
0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 6.56. 
 
 
Table B.14a 
Chi-Square Test for Attend Public Meeting by Sample 
 
  
Value 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 13.905 1 .000 
Number of Valid Cases 1203     
0 cells (.0%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 40.26. 
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Table B.14b 
Chi-Square Test for Attend Public Meeting by CPS Subgroup 
 
  
Value 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 7.487 3 .058 
Number of Valid Cases 138     
0 cells (.0%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 10.26. 
 
Table B.15a 
Chi-Square Test for Discuss Politics by Sample 
 
  
Value 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 240.935 1 .000 
Number of Valid Cases 1204     
0 cells (.0%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 48.83. 
 
 
Table B.15b 
Chi-Square Test for Discussed Politics by CPS Subgroup 
 
  
Value 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 6.666 3 .083 
Number of Valid Cases 139     
4 cells (50.0%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.38. 
 
 
Table B.16a 
Chi-Square Test for Listen to Talk Radio by Sample 
 
   
Value 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 40.406 1 .000 
Number of Valid Cases 1203     
0 cells (.0%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 65.03. 
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Table B.16b 
Chi-Square Test for Listen to Talk Radio by CPS Subgroup 
 
  
Value 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.676 3 .642 
Number of Valid Cases 137     
0 cells (.0%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 6.48. 
 
Table B.17a 
Chi-Square Test for Try to Influence Voters By Sample 
 
  
Value 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 11.863 1 .001 
Number of Valid Cases 1205     
0 cells (.0%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 69.10. 
 
 
Table B.17b 
Chi-Square Test for Try to Influence Voters by CPS Subgroup 
 
  
Value 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 5.148 3 .161 
Number of Valid Cases 139     
0 cells (.0%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 8.63. 
 
 
Table B.18a 
Chi-Square Test for Attend Campaign Meeting by Sample 
 
  
Value 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 23.523 1 .000 
Number of Valid Cases 1205     
0 cells (.0%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 12.57. 
 
 
149 
  
 
Table B.18b  
Chi-Square Test for Attend Campaign Meeting by CPS Subgroup 
 
  
Value 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 19.389 3 .000 
Number of Valid Cases 139     
1 cell (12.5%) has an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.83. 
 
 
Table B.19a 
Chi-Square Test for Display Campaign Sign by Sample 
 
  
Value 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 15.145 1 .000 
Number of Valid Cases 1205     
0 cells (.0%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 31.03. 
 
 
Table B.19b 
Chi-Square Test for Display Campaign Sign by CPS Subgroup 
 
  
Value 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 10.104 3 .018 
Number of Valid Cases 139     
0 cells (.0%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 8.46. 
 
 
Table B.20a 
Chi-Square Tests for Contribute to Candidate by Sample 
 
  
Value 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 63.166 1 .000 
Number of Valid Cases 1205     
0 cells (.0%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 17.07. 
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Table B.20b 
Chi-Square Test for Contribute to Candidate by CPS Subgroup  
 
  
Value 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 15.290 3 .002 
Number of Valid Cases 139     
0 cells (.0%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 7.94. 
 
 
Table B.21a 
Chi-Square Test for Contributions to Party by Sample 
 
  
Value 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 38.312 1 .000 
Number of Valid Cases 1203     
0 cells (.0%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 16.06. 
 
 
Table B.21b 
Chi-Square Test for Contributions to Party by CPS Subgroup 
 
  
Value 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 18.689 3 .000 
Number of Valid Cases 139     
0 cells (.0%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 6.56. 
 
 
Table B.22a 
Chi-Square Test for Contribute to Other Group by Sample 
 
  
Value 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 119.689 1 .000 
Number of Valid Cases 1203     
0 cells (.0%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 13.31. 
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Table B.22b 
Chi-Square Test for Contribute to Other Group by CPS Subgroup 
 
  
Value 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 27.512 3 .000 
Number of Valid Cases 138     
0 cells (.0%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 8.52. 
 
 
Table B.23a 
Chi-Square Test for Vote by Sample 
 
  
Value 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 14.098 1 .000 
Number of Valid Cases 676     
0 cells (.0%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 21.18. 
 
 
Table B.23b 
Chi-Square Test for Vote by CPS Subgroup 
 
  
Value 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 9.236 3 .026 
Number of Valid Cases 139     
4 cells (50.0%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.21. 
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Table B.24a 
Independent Samples Test for People Like Me Don't Have Any Say by Sample 
 
 Levene's Test for 
Equality of 
Variances 
 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
 
 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
 
F 
 
Sig. 
 
t 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Sig.  
(2-tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
                Lower Upper 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
15.207 .000 -4.994 1202 .000 -.56 .11 -.77 -.34 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
    -5.405 185.203 .000 -.56 .10 -.76 -.35 
 
 
Table B.24b 
One-Way Analysis of Variance for People Like Me Don't Have Any Say by CPS 
Subgroup 
  
 Sum of 
Squares 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Mean 
Square 
 
F 
 
Significance 
Between Groups 9.493 3 3.164 2.592 .055 
Within Groups 164.791 135 1.221     
Total 174.284 138       
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Table B.25a 
Independent Samples Test for Elections Make Government Pay Attention by Sample 
 
 Levene's Test 
for Equality 
of Variances 
 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
 
 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
 
F 
 
Sig. 
 
t 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Sig.  
(2-tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
       Lower Upper 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
18.462 .000 -6.307 1202 .000 -.71 .11 -.92 -.49 
Equal 
variances 
not assumed 
    -7.049 193.288 .000 -.71 .10 -.90 -.51 
 
 
Table B.25b 
One-Way Analysis of Variance for Elections Make Government Pay Attention by CPS 
Subgroup 
 
 Sum of 
Squares 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Mean 
Square 
 
F 
 
Significance 
Between Groups 1.454 3 .485 .399 .754 
Within Groups 166.305 137 1.214     
Total 167.759 140       
 
 
Table B.26a 
Independent Samples Test for Government Run by a Few Big Interests by Sample 
 
 Levene's Test for 
Equality of 
Variances 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
 
 
 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
 
 
F 
 
 
Sig. 
 
 
t 
 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
 
Sig.  
(2-tailed) 
 
Mean 
Difference 
Standard 
Error 
Difference 
       Lower Upper 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
879.640 .000 2.207 1164 .028 .37 .17 .004 .71 
Equal 
variances 
not assumed 
    3.380 285.713 .001 .37 .11 .16 .59 
 
 
154 
  
 
Table B.26b 
One-Way Analysis of Variance for Government Run by a Few Big Interests by CPS 
Subgroup 
 
 Sum of 
Squares 
Degrees of 
freedom 
Mean 
Square 
 
F 
 
Significance 
Between Groups 22.977 3 7.659 7.299 .000 
Within Groups 143.761 137 1.049     
Total 166.738 140       
 
 
Table B.26 c 
Dunnett C Multiple Comparisons for Government Run by a Few Big Interests by CPS 
Subgroup 
 
 
 
 
(I) CPS Subgroup 
 
 
 
(J) CPS Subgroup 
Mean Difference 
(I-J) 
Standard 
Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
  Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Animal Rights Aircraft Over DC -.55 .26 -1.32 .21 
  Re-entry Documents .008 .26 -.64 .79 
  Toxic Chemicals .55 .26 -.14 1.23 
Aircraft Over DC Animal Rights .55 .26 -.21 1.32 
  Re-entry Documents .63 .24 .005 1.31 
  Toxic Chemicals 1.10* .24 .46 1.74 
Re-entry Documents Animal Rights .008 .26 -.79 .64 
  Aircraft Over DC -.63 .24 -1.31 .005 
  Toxic Chemicals .47 .23 -.11 1.04 
Toxic Chemicals Animal Rights -.55 .26 -1.23 .14 
  Aircraft Over DC -1.10* .24 -1.74 -.46 
  Re-entry Documents -.47 .23 -1.04 .11 
*  The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. 
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Appendix C 
 
Statistical Tables Not Included in the Text of Chapter 5 
 
 
Table C.1 
Chi-Square Test for Get Information From Government  
 
  
Value 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Asymp. Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 19.655 3 .000 
Number of Valid Cases 125     
0 cells (.0%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 10.40. 
 
 
Table C.2 
Chi-Square Test for Organization Ask You to Make Comment  
 
  
Value 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Asymp. Sig. 
 (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 52.384 3 .000 
Number of Valid Cases 137     
0 cells (.0%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 10.82 
 
 
Table C.3 
Chi-Square Test for Contact Elected Official About Issue  
 
  
Value 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 4.308 3 .230 
N of Valid Cases 137     
0 cells (.0%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 10.63. 
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Table C.4 
Chi-Square Test for Made Previous Comments  
 
  
Value 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 13.440 3 .004 
Number of Valid Cases 139     
0 cells (.0%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 7.29. 
 
 
Table C.5 
Chi-Square Test for Same or Different Issue  
 
  
Value 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 11.092 3 .011 
Number of Valid Cases 102     
1 cell (12.5%) has an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.43. 
 
 
Table C.6 
Chi-square Test for Comment Made Via Internet  
 
  
Value 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 3.276 3 .351 
Number of Valid Cases 141     
0 cells (.0%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.16. 
 
 
Table C.7 
Chi-Square Test for Ease of Making Comment  
 
  
Value 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 6.385 6 .381 
Number of Valid Cases 141     
4 cells (33.3%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is .37. 
 
